

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

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JULY-AUGUST 1957

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30

Hungary's Struggle for Freedom

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

No. 29

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F. Lohenbill

THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING

"1984" Disproved

THE extent of the political difficulties encountered in the countries occupied by Russia as well as in Russia itself, has become increasingly clear during the last few years. Yet until a short while ago, eager scribes vied with the official propaganda in denying the very existence of any opposition behind the Iron Curtain. The fear of the seemingly invincible power of Russian totalitarianism drove many progressive forces to passive resignation. This mood of capitulation found its most pointed expression in George Orwell's disconsolately cheap penny-dreadful "1984", published in 1949. In this book, the author shows how powerful he expected totalitarianism to become, when he makes a representative of his imaginary society of the future say the following to a still vacillating victim:

... You are imagining that there is something called human nature which will be outraged by what we do and will turn against us. But we create human nature. Men are infinitely malleable. Or perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the proletarians or the slaves will arise and overthrow us. Put it out of your mind. They are helpless, like the animals. Humanity is the Party. The others are outside—irrelevant.

Now let us hold against this gutter press clap-trap what Lajos Lederer has to say in his report about the events in Hungary in the *Observer* of 25th November 1956:

At first, there was a great deal I could not understand. I was told that most of the youngsters I met, there and everywhere in the vanguard of the revolt, were members of the Communist youth organisations. They were the children of the "new life", brought up in the spirit of "political consciousness, discipline, and enthusiastic devotion to the party".

Indoctrination for them had started in their crèches. What had happened to the Master Plan—the plan to create and build a new type of citizen, the "new socialist man" of Stalin and Rakosi?

I wanted to know, and I did not have long to wait. "Our future is in our hands: let us make a list of our demands," said one of the girl students in a quiet, unemotional voice. There were about forty in the room. And each one had to have his say:—

"We do not wish to be directed or cared for any longer by the State" . . . "We do not want the State to decide how we are to be educated and what careers we are to make" . . . "We want to regain our independence as individuals, and also as a people" . . . "Plainly, the Russians must go" . . .

Later, I talked to one of the teachers at the institute. The Communist education had failed utterly to win over the young, he said. Their behaviour now showed just how hollow the whole pretence had been. They repeated their slogans mechanically, but never for a moment believed what they said. In one way, certainly, Hungarian youth had been affected by the indoctrination drive—but not in the way intended. On the contrary, all those who had submitted to Marxist-Leninist propaganda would now be found completely immune from it.

"You will not find a Communist student in my class, or in all the university for that matter, or in any other university throughout the land. And soon you will see that this is true of the workers' youth organisations in the factories and the mines." Indeed. I did see. Whatever may be the case in the Soviet Union, the Communist idea in Hungary is dead.

Rarely has a conception been disproved more clearly and thoroughly by the facts than Orwell's. His totalitarian puppets were replaced by human beings of flesh and blood. Even under Stalin's dictatorship, unsurpassed in history

for its cruelty, the spark of freedom was never completely extinguished. His rule was an unceasing struggle against the people. Yet neither his powerful police apparatus nor the system of slave camps spread over the whole of Russia, was able to break the people's resistance. During his lifetime already, the great popular movements were developing in Russia and in the satellite countries. He was hardly dead (or murdered) when the 17th June in eastern Germany and the great revolt of the slaves, starting from Vorkuta, served notice on his successors that even the cruellest tyranny has its limits.

Moscow's Liberalisation Plan

Thus Stalin's successors were confronted with problems which even the skilled hand of the "master" could not have managed. The Russian people were fed up with promises of a better future; they demanded immediate action. Khrushchev was well aware of the mood of the Russian people when he made his anti-Stalin speech at the 20th party congress. This speech was directed solely against some excrescences of Stalinism; but the *essence* of Stalinism and Stalin's "greatness" were expressly recognised. The speech had the sole aim of placating the opposition inside the Russian slave empire by means of a relaxation directed from above, which left untouched the core of dictatorship. This attempt of Khrushchev's was playing with fire. If he hoped to succeed where many an absolute ruler before him had failed, he was mistaken.

In the satellite countries, the Russian "liberalisation plan" fanned the already smouldering embers of resistance into bright flames. Moscow's rehabilitation of Tito encouraged the peoples suppressed by Russia in their fight for national independence. The playing with democracy and the relaxation of the dictatorship brought nationalist elements to the fore inside the Stalinist organisations and caused democratic longings which went far beyond the measure of "freedom" doled out by Russia.

The tendency towards liberalisation took root above all in Poland, causing even dreams of a re-establishment of parliamentary rule after the fashion of bourgeois states. The Sejm was already rehearsing for this with a certain, though very limited, freedom of debate. But this dream of democracy at the top was suddenly disturbed by the action of the Polish people. The national Stalinists were surprised to find themselves at the head of a popular movement and the Russians, bent upon preventing at any price the development of a revolutionary popular movement, granted them very real concessions for the Polish people.

Of all satellite régimes, the one in Hungary showed the most stubborn resistance against any real relaxation. Inside the organisation of Hungarian writers, Moscow's policy had led to lively discussions aiming at making the existing conditions more democratic. But the government made no concession whatever beyond the rehabilitation of Rajk and the others who had been unjustly condemned to death. On the contrary, the writers were reproved and the demand for re-institution of Imre Nagy who had been dismissed because of his more liberal economic policies, remained unfulfilled.

The Rising

From Poland, the popular movement leaped over to Hungary. Hungarian students organised demonstrations of sympathy for Poland, in which they put forward their own demands. The armed uprising was unleashed by a demonstration of students who intended to approach the government in a peaceful way and to present demands which, in their opinion, remained entirely within the

confines of the more liberal Moscow policies. In this, the Hungarian uprising followed the classical example of numerous popular insurrections. The clash was caused by brutal acts of violence on the part of the government against a peaceful popular demonstration, in this case by the shots fired into the mass of demonstrators in Budapest by nervous Hungarian security police.

When soldiers, called to the assistance of the security police, fraternised with the people and gave arms to the demonstrators, the spread of the uprising over the whole of Hungary was only a question of time. The factories, under the lead of the young workers, spontaneously sided with the students. The uprising spread from factory to factory and from town to town. Everywhere, councils of students, workers and soldiers were formed which could count upon effective help from the peasants. Right from the start, power was in the hands of the people. The state under its successive governments had lost all importance. A striking feature of the Hungarian uprising, with hardly a precedent in the history of popular insurrections, is the clear distinction between people and state. Against a state divested of all its totality and transformed into a complete nonentity, there stood the whole people united and undifferentiated.

In the reports of the western press, this is expressed by the fact that the insurgents, at first referred to in the usual jargon as "mob" or "rebels", are suddenly called "Hungarians"—a term so banal as to be ridiculous if it did not convey the recognition of the fact that no previous uprising had been as little influenced by *sectional interests* as the Hungarian.

The material basis for this phenomenon had been created by Stalinist leveling. In contrast to all previous popular uprisings, the one in Hungary was not impeded by property interests, since the state acting as general capitalist had incurred the opposition of all layers of the population.

According to the *Observer* of 11th November, the student demonstrators put forward five demands: (1) A central congress of the Communist Party to elect a new leadership; (2) Imre Nagy to replace Hegedus as Premier; (3) Continued friendship with the Soviet Union, but on a new basis; (4) Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; (5) The holding of free elections. While the three first demands lie within the orbit of the Kremlin's policy of liberalisation, the two last ones are attacks against Stalinism itself. The five-point program is obviously a compromise between national Stalinists striving for a "liberalised" Stalinism freed from Russian domination on the one hand and, on the other, democratic forces aiming at a complete change of conditions.

At first, only one of these demands was fulfilled. Imre Nagy, that frightened, punished and intimidated Stalinist, became Premier of a government consisting of Stalinists with "clean records". The myth surrounding Nagy is one of the most peculiar features of the revolution. The *Observer* of 11th November gives the following report about the meeting of Nagy with the demonstrating students:

When Mr. Nagy finally did appear on the Parliament steps, he left the crowd unsatisfied by his guarded remarks. As one student said to me: "He was only a private citizen now, and was afraid to answer our demands because of Gerö (the First Secretary of the Party)."

When Nagy finally was made Premier, the revolution had long passed its Gomulka stage. Imre Nagy, whose elevation to the premiership the students fighting against the Kremlin had so unceasingly demanded, started his rule under the protection of *Russian tanks*.

He promised a democratisation of the country and with the threat of capital punishment bade the "*counter-revolutionaries*" lay down their arms. The people were not satisfied with his declarations. They had begun to take their destiny into their own hands and saw with unerring instinct that the main obstacle to progress of any kind was the presence of Russian troops within the country. Against the foreign occupation, the Hungarian people fought with a heroism and a spirit of self-sacrifice unsurpassed in world history. The very children carried arms, ten and eleven year-olds threw themselves with hand grenades against the armoured cars, and even unarmed civilians barred the way to Russian troops with cold fury and clenched fists. In the matchless solidarity of the entire people, Communist Party members stood on the barricades shoulder to shoulder with their compatriots.

The Nagy government was completely powerless in the face of the people's action and had to acknowledge as an insurgent people those whom, only yesterday, they had tried to brand as counter-revolutionaries. The government promised concessions after concessions to the uprising. But *all* fighting Hungarians, from the national Stalinists to the Democrats, considered these promises meaningless as long as Russian troops remained in the country. But just on this point, the government showed itself persistent and unyielding. The withdrawal of Russian troops was promised only on one condition: previous surrender of arms. However, the insurgents saw quite clearly that to accept that condition would amount to capitulation. They continued to fight on persistently until, after a week of heroic struggle, the Russian armoured divisions had been beaten and the insurrection appeared to have been victorious. The Nagy government had to give in all along the line, to accept the demands of the insurgents, declare Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw pact, proclaim its neutrality, appeal for help to the United Nations and promise free and secret elections.

Rarely has any government made such a complete change of front. The Nagy government was able to do so only because it did not represent anything but itself. The state which, during the totalitarian transformation of economics and politics, had established itself as the collective exploiter to a large extent (within the capitalist system, it can never do so completely), could not rely on any social layer in its hour of danger. There were on the one side the peasants, hostile towards "collectivisation", on the other the workers who were neither able nor willing to restore the nationalised industries to private owners but were, like the peasants, ardently interested in freeing the entire economy from the stranglehold of the oppressor state—an interest which allied them both politically and economically with the rest of society (artisans, small businessmen, professional men, students etc.) and fused them all into one solid bloc. Thus the Nagy government represented no social layer, nor had it an economic function; it was suspended in mid-air and only continued to exist because it was tolerated by the insurgents.

But why did the insurgents continue to the very last to negotiate with that spectre of a government, instead of sending it packing and replacing it by the councils as the only really representative organs of the popular will? This is explained by the character of the movement which was bound to aim at a *political overturn* in order to free the country from external and internal oppression, but was unable to advance towards a *social* revolution, namely to a real transformation of the capitalist system, as long as Hungary remained backward and isolated in its backwardness. In such conditions, the economy can only in name, but never in reality "fall into the hands of the people" (to

assert that it does that, is the essence of Stalinist fraud), and in such conditions, a government is indispensable for internal and international reasons. It was therefore the obvious thing to negotiate with, and to support, that government which had accepted all demands aiming at a freer and more "normal", but nevertheless still completely, capitalist development, and which could be held in check by the councils.

After the defeat of the occupation troops, Nagy declared that the Russians were to withdraw from the country, and outward appearances bore him out. In actual fact, however, the Kremlin used the time it had gained in order to bring up reinforcements and to prepare a new blood bath. The Russian government attempted to justify the treacherous and dastardly breach of its promises by pointing to the danger of a counter-revolution. The confusion caused by this absurd explanation in the camp of Stalinism and of the "progressive Left", is exemplified by Jean Romain who wrote in *Le Monde* of November 2nd:

In Hungary, victory has fallen to the revolution or, if you prefer, to the counter-revolution. The traditional terminology according to which the peoples make the revolutions and military cliques, supported by the Church and the big land owners, make the counter-revolutions, is not applicable to Hungary, because the Hungarian revolution was the revolt of an entire people.

Romain realises correctly that the Hungarian uprising differs from historical tradition in that it was the action of an entire people. But if he thinks that it nevertheless can be called a counter-revolution, this can be explained only by the confusion generated by the official propaganda according to which the fascist despotism ruling in Russia represents Communist revolution. If Stalinist reaction tries to justify its suppression of the Hungarian uprising by the danger of a restoration of "previous" forms of oppression, this means truly putting the cart before the horse. A Hungarian refugee trade-unionist said with great justification that, compared to the Stalinist régime, Horthy's rule had been a humanitarian institution.

Stalinism is the lowest point retrogression has reached so far. Private capitalism, under which the people have incomparably more freedom, or even feudalism, under which the serfs had at least some rights besides their duties, are definitely preferable to state capitalism with its brutalities such as forced labour, slave camps and the exploitation practised in the collectives.

In reality, however, the question is not posed in that way. Representatives of the existing capitalist conditions would not even seriously consider replacing the state-capitalist forms existing in Hungary by private capitalism. State-capitalist "solutions" have spread through the whole world. They are the last answer a disintegrating system can find to its difficulties. Thus Social-Democrats like Anna Kethly have gone on record for upholding the "economic achievements" of Hungary and have thereby proved that they, too, do not know a real alternative to the economy of state capitalism.

After the events in Hungary, the opinion that Stalinism is reactionary, begins to spread in the West as well. In *Europäische Zeitung* published in Bonn, Dr. Klaus Pietl writes under the heading "Communism is Reactionary":

The sacrifice of the Hungarians has clearly demonstrated before the eyes of the whole world the breakdown of Communism as a *Weltanschauung*. From now on, everybody will know that the great and true revolutions of the second half of the twentieth century are directed against a small layer of Communist functionaries who oppress and exploit the masses. The theory and practice of Marxism are from now on *reactionary* and the true tradition of the French revolution is on the side of those who fight against Communism.

True—one has only to substitute Stalinism for Marxism and to add that the true popular revolutions of the twentieth century are directed against small oppressing minorities everywhere in the world.

The Hungarian Uprising and the West

Demonstrations of sympathy for the Hungarian freedom fighters were world-wide and as spontaneous as was the uprising. Never yet have there been, on an international scale, such popular spontaneous demonstrations against Stalinism as the great protest demonstrations in, for instance, Berlin, Paris and Warsaw. In addition, there were sympathy strikes in Rumania and refusals on the part of British dockers and of longshoremen in New York to handle goods to and from Russia. Young people everywhere showed themselves eager to rush, arms in hand, to the aid of the Hungarians. In one sentence: Enthusiasm for Hungary united all layers of all peoples in the world and the magnificent uprising touched the heart of the "man in the street" as hardly any previous event had done.

If the people everywhere strove to help the Hungarians, their rulers aimed at the exact opposite. Immediately before the events in Hungary, Mr. Dulles, the American Foreign Secretary, was asked in a television programme what he intended to do if more Russian troops were to be sent to Poland. Mr. Dulles talked about the Warsaw Pact and about security pacts in general, and then said about the question of the Russians sending troops into the satellite countries: "Technically they perhaps have the legal right to do that under the Warsaw Pact". The Kremlin, of course, did not need this hint that the United States would place no obstacles in the way of an intervention by Russian troops; but Mr. Dulles was sorely in need of pulling the wool over the eyes of the believers in the "East-West cleavage" and of adducing a "technical" justification for the butchery of the Kremlin rulers.

Later, after the events in Hungary had already passed their climax and when the presidential elections in America were over, president Eisenhower, according to *Die Tat* of November 16th 1956, "declared that the United States had never advocated an open rebellion on the part of an unarmed population against overwhelming forces and in conditions in which they could never prevail. It had always been American policy to keep alive the spirit of freedom and hope. Never had the Hungarians been urged to an armed uprising which could only end in catastrophe." According to the American president, the Hungarians should apparently have been content with a "hidden" rebellion, with the "spirit" of freedom and with hope. For, if ever the spirit strives towards action, the peoples can be quite sure that they cannot count on Eisenhower and the other "democratic" governments. In contrast to the president's protestations, however, the disappointed Hungarian freedom fighters declared that America, over radio "Free Europe", had for years urged them to fight, but had betrayed them at the decisive moment.

Even more edifying and animated by the purest "spirit of freedom" was Mr. Dulles's statement that America was not going to "exploit" Russia's difficulties. That is obvious! The "cold war" is conducted only when there are no difficulties in the path of the Kremlin gang and when there is therefore nothing to "exploit". But as soon as difficulties arise, the United States government endeavours to remove them. Thus Victor Riesel, specialist in Labour questions, relates how, while the bulk of the talent at the disposal of the State Department was concentrating on the territory east of Suez, at least one of the

diplomats was set the task of breaking the New York longshoremen's boycott against the import of Russian goods into the U.S.A.

If this mission were successfully accomplished, he pointed out, the State Department would have removed the only workers' boycott against Russian goods existing anywhere in the world. Labour leaders everywhere had made furious noises and accepted thundering resolutions against the butchery in Hungary, but they had meekly avoided any direct action which could have seriously damaged Russia's economy. Only the New York longshoremen had refused Russian goods. They had, moreover, considered introducing a clause into their new agreements with shippers which would give them the legal right to refuse to unload goods manufactured in slave camps and prison-factories of Iron Curtain countries. All this corresponded to the traditions of the militant labour movement. But there existed a concerted pressure by all western governments upon all free workers with the aim of satisfying the sellers of slave labour goods. On November 30th, 1956, trade-union leaders from 88 countries had congregated in Brussels. They had had before them a plan that all transport workers, all dockers, all air-freight loaders, all engineers and all producers of strategic material destined for the Soviet bloc should go on strike rather than work and produce for the Russian dictators and their armies. This would have put the Russian economy under pressure. The Kremlin would have been unable to obtain foreign exchange in order to buy material for its armies. But on November 30th, the leaders of the free trade-unions of the world rejected specific plans for a boycott against the Russians. Who had the power to put pressure on them, was a mystery. Why they expended their bravery upon words rather than deeds, was even more mysterious. And why just the State Department desired to break the only boycott left in the whole world, was a mystery within a mystery.

In reality, the affair is no more mysterious than the attitude taken up by official circles in Germany towards the liberation movements in the satellite countries. This attitude is strikingly illuminated by the following report from Bonn in *Die Tat* of November 14th:

... An example among others is the disturbance caused by the declarations made in Vienna by the Free-Democrat deputy, Hubertus Prince Loewenstein, after his return from Budapest, in which he is said to have arrived at the conclusion, based on his experiences in Hungary, that German re-unification could only be brought about by a popular uprising in the Soviet zone. These utterances made by the Prince... have caused justified disquiet here and have earned him sharp criticism from many sides. ... For it is a fact that nothing has been more feared here during the last few weeks than a spreading of the Hungarian uprising to the German Democratic Republic, and another 17th June with even more disastrous results. All the propaganda directed into the Soviet zone had the twofold aim of, on the one hand, discrediting the present leadership of the S.E.D. under Walter Ulbricht... and, on the other, of keeping back the population of eastern Germany from precipitous actions. With surprising unanimity, the responsible politicians and publicists in western Germany have drawn conclusions from the Hungarian example exactly opposite to those of the aristocratic misleader from Amorbach, namely, that in the present situation in the Communist empire, including its German sector, the important thing is not a senseless attempt at overthrowing the regime, but rather its relaxation... For similar reasons, several quarters have lately sharply criticised the activities of the radio transmitter "Free Europe", managed by an American private company, which is especially reproached for having in its Hungarian broadcasts during the fighting in Budapest, encouraged the insurgents' hopes of armed aid from the West.

"A relaxation of the régime" is the slogan put out by Moscow, which Bonn and the West hold out to the peoples of the East who are fighting for their freedom. According to *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of November 1st, 1956, Eisen-

hower has endorsed the Gomulka régime: "After a short historical recapitulation, he stated that the Poles had achieved a peaceful transition to a new government which appeared to be seriously bent upon serving the Polish people." Gomulka, this Stalinist of long standing, is a man after the heart of the western politicians, for he has managed to canalise the opposition in the country, to prevent an uprising and to keep the Polish people so far in submission.

As in the case of the east German uprising in June 1953, all politicians without exception tried to excuse the failure of the West to aid the Hungarian uprising by the necessity of avoiding a world war at all costs. But could backward Russia, torn with internal dissensions, have waged war against the West? The simple truth is that the Kremlin acts in "technical" agreement with the West and that a resolute attitude on the part of the United States would have forced the Russian rulers to yield just as certainly as it had before in Iran. The Russian slave holders, for their part, know only too well that a war would lead to the dissolution of their empire and would finish their régime of terror, because it would be a signal for the oppressed peoples and for the Russian people itself, to shake off the hated yoke. In a serious liberation struggle, the Kremlin can never rely upon its soldiers—they would go over *en masse* to the welcome "enemy", as happened in Hungary, where Russian soldiers went over to the insurgents in their thousands. These Russian soldiers were, as Salvador de Madariaga very well put it in a letter to the *Manchester Guardian*, the only "international volunteers" who fought on the side of the Hungarians.

If therefore the West had supported the Hungarian uprising by supplying arms, thereby "encouraging" the other slaves of the Kremlin, then Moscow would have had no alternative to giving up this position and, in the end, all others. This, however (and here Victor Riesel's alleged mystery including the mystery within the mystery begins to fall away), is just what the rulers of the West do not want. A victory of the Hungarian uprising would, as has been pointed out before, first have led to a conflagration in the whole of Stalin's empire. Secondly, the liberation of the satellites and the re-unification of Germany, would have upset the post-war "balance" of power established under the leadership of America and would have dealt a decisive blow to American plans of world domination. Thirdly, the disappearance of the "Russian danger" would have deprived Washington of a means of exerting pressure not only in foreign but, above all, also in internal politics, because it would have made it difficult to justify to the American people the gigantic and senseless arms expenditure without which the American economy on its present basis can no longer exist. In the end, the rebellion of those in the home country who live in oppression and have been deprived of all happiness, could no longer have been avoided—that is the innermost core of the "mystery" underlying the attitude taken up by the western governments towards the events in Hungary.

Not only did the West do nothing to help the Hungarians, but it actually helped the Kremlin by the attack against Egypt started by Israel and continued by Britain and France. When Eden and Mollet shouted about Hungary in order to divert attention from their own attack against a small nation, then the Stalinist robbers could shout all the louder about Egypt in order to divert attention from Hungary. The Kremlin even pretended to the soldiers sent to Hungary that they were on their way to Suez in order to defend a small nation against violation. This was indeed a case of brothers in spirit who dealt each other the cards!

Tito's "Solution"

It has become common usage to call every stirring of opposition in the Stalinist camp "Titoism". Under this name, both national Stalinist and democratic opposition movements are confused. In the interest of political clarity, however, it has to be made clear that Titoism and democracy have nothing in common.

The importance of Tito and the movement led by him, consisted in his being the first national representative of Stalinism who managed to break out from the stranglehold of Moscow. Tito has liberated Yugoslavia from Moscow's domination. But liberation from national oppression by a foreign power did not liberate Yugoslavia from its own Stalinist tyranny. On the contrary, Tito formed his own rule exactly after Stalin's model. To be sure, the liberation of the economy from Moscow's domination made it possible to relax pressure to a certain degree. Together with Russian co-ownership in Yugoslavia's industry and with deliveries to Russia, the necessity for over-industrialisation disappeared. In industry, even a certain decentralisation took place, and the pace of collectivisation in agriculture was considerably slowed down. The workers were given, by way of factory committees, the right to "constructive" criticism on the plane of the *individual factory* only. Less severe prison sentences and a certain "security" of the person replaced the harsh sentences and the arbitrariness practised during the Stalin era.

These measures have made life in Yugoslavia somewhat easier. Yet political dictatorship and an economy of scarcity with state direction still exist as before. Tito's relaxation of repression did not alter anything in the essence of the political and economic system.

The exploitation of the people in the interests of a senseless and bureaucratic industrialisation is being continued by Tito exactly after the Moscow pattern. In principle, the "Yugoslav way towards socialism" is no different from Stalin's state-capitalist barbarism. Even Stalin's rule, after all, was not all the time as terrible and draconic as it was during the last few years.

National Stalinist attempts at finding their own way towards "socialism" aim at nothing else but at introducing, without Russian oppression, yet exactly after the Russian pattern, a bureaucratically distorted industrialisation which far from serving the well-being of the people, deprives them of happiness and freedom.

With sure instinct, the rulers of the West recognised Tito's totalitarianism as the worthy successor of Russian Stalinism whose wearing out has become only a question of time. But they were mistaken if they imagined that Titoism could come unscathed through the Hungarian crisis.

During the events in Hungary, Tito's régime suffered days of nervous tension; the Yugoslav people looked expectantly towards Hungary which showed them the way out from their own slavery. It goes without saying that Tito did not come to the help of the Hungarian uprising. He did not hesitate to put the blame for the events upon Russia but, when the popular revolution turned against Stalinism in every shape and form, he quickly sided with Moscow against the "counter-revolution".

Tito did not fail to profit from the events in Hungary. In spite of all official Yugoslav communiqués, it has not become clear to this day how it was possible that Nagy, Mrs. Rajk and the other Hungarian national Stalinists who had asked for asylum in the Yugoslav embassy, fell into the hands of the Russians. (One would have expected national Stalinists to know their onions and not so easily to walk into the Russian trap!)

What is certain, however, is that Tito made use of the discussion with Moscow caused by this incident, in order to restore in the eyes of his people his somewhat tarnished reputation as a nationalist opposed to Russia. Under cover of this rediscovered opposition to Russia, he struck a blow against Djilas, his collaborator of old, who was sent to prison for his criticism. In theoretical studies which, as a wise precaution, he took care to place in the hands of representatives of the international press, Djilas had considered whether the Communist (read Stalinist) system could still be maintained against the increasing popular movements. Independent thinking, however, is not permitted in Tito's realm. And this the brazen oppressor Tito followed up by a demagogic speech in which he accused Khrushchew of "Stalinism"!

The uprising in Hungary has shown quite clearly that the road to freedom does not lead through Titoism. It has dealt the death blow to all ideologies which, hypnotised by the omnipotence of totalitarianism, prophesied fascism as the inevitable future of mankind. It has shown that a people's will for freedom can prevail even against the most terrible of tyrannies. If, in the end, the people had to yield before Russian armour, yet its resistance is not by any means extinguished. Thus the Hungarian uprising marks a turning point in history. As the first large-scale popular uprising against Stalinism, it was the dress rehearsal for yet more important events, and showed the peoples in East and West a way out from capitalist barbarism which would completely engulf even the West if Orwell and kindred spirits were to prove right. Its lesson is that, in the impending great struggle of liberation, the peoples can have confidence only in their own strength, but have nothing to expect from "democratic" governments.

26th December 1956

Willis Fowler

HUNGARIAN FREEDOM AND THE COLD WAR

I

FROM the hard stone of the twentieth—the totalitarian—century, the Hungarian people have chiselled an incredible monument to human courage. Yet their struggle for liberation has been betrayed. From its beginning the revolt was greeted with stark indifference by Western statesmen. Its initial successes elicited only embarrassed silence and . . . the attack on Suez. When the Russians were temporarily put to rout and the entire nation was appealing for effective aid, not the slightest measure of support, diplomatic or other, was forthcoming. When—with full "permission" given, as it were, by the assault upon Egypt and the complete focusing of official attention on the Middle East

—the Russians returned and began the destruction of Budapest and the mass deportation of Hungarian youth, official America could relieve itself only of the cheapest cold war clichés. Boldly, the well-paid “defenders of liberty” hurled powerful epithets at the advancing Russian armor. Heroically, the Kremlin was denounced as bloody, barbaric, ruthless, murderer of the helpless. Piously, it was pronounced illegal, immoral, atheistic, violator of the Judaeo-Christian ethic. But no “agonizing reappraisals” convulsed the high priest of “brink-of-war”-ism and “massive retaliation” in the State Department. No “American sense of fair play” or “siding with the underdog” moved the dispenser of cheap sentiments in the White House, from whose every vent have poured “crusade”, “liberation”, and assorted freedom-preaching for so many years. (“Of course”, nothing could be done by the “democratic” directors of Britain, France, and Israel.)

During the weeks of intense fighting, miles of Hungarian border stood open; clearly defined Hungarian soil was in the hands of the freedom fighters; “give us arms!” was on the lips of a beleaguered people. With only the lack of anti-tank weapons standing between the Hungarians and freedom (the Russians had been careful to withhold these from their satellite forces), with clear signs of imminent uprisings throughout the satellite nations, with Russian soldiers requiring only encouragement and opportunity to turn wholeheartedly against their masters, with the Kremlin torn by divided interests, with the termination of the cold war itself on a truly progressive and almost bloodless basis within sight, the “fearless” American policy came full circle from its pretences of safer days. “Liberation” was discarded in favor of “containment” (formerly condemned as akin to treason). “Massive retaliation” was miraculously transformed into “moral force”, and “go-it-alone” into “reliance upon the United Nations”. “Brink-of-war”-ism faded into “fear of provoking World War III”, and “standing up to aggression” into a very “sincere” (and a very new) “concern for Russian security”.

This “fear” of provoking the Kremlin, this concern for *Russian* security originates not from worried mothers with draft-age sons, but from the self-appointed leaders of the “free world” and of the crusade against “Communism” who occupy the high posts of Washington. It originates from that instrument of international power which *ordered* the Russians to leave Iran in 1946 (oil, rather than human freedom, was involved here), which stopped “Communism” in Greece, which did not fear the provocation of supplying by air the blockaded city of Berlin inside the Russian “security zone”. Fear of provoking Russia is now handed out to the world by that power which does not hesitate to ring Russia with air bases and aircraft carriers (where stand nuclear bombers in flight readiness), which supplies arms to Russia’s closest neighbors, which “drew the line” in Korea.

This seemingly enigmatic reversal of line was not unpredictable. It is, in fact, the consistent extension of American policy during the Second World War and a necessary consequence of the commitment to maintain the American economy on its artificial basis of arms production. The long-range American war aims in Europe were the destruction of German economic viability by partition and occupation, the settlement of the fates of the ever-frustrated East European nations striving for independent economic development,¹ and the preparation for future use of another “enemy” (a more permanent, less

¹ See “Eastern Europe Under The Iron Heel”, by Robert Keller, *Contemporary Issues*, Number 13.

dangerous "enemy" than Germany). To these ends, the introduction of Russian oppression into Eastern Europe was essential. All decisive American war policies were directed toward prolonging the duration of the conflict so that the plodding *gendarme* could move into position: unconditional surrender, widespread bombing of Germany, invasion of the European continent from its westernmost approaches. All were designed to rob the Nazi rulers of every better insight, to seal their hold over the German population, and to leave the path open to Russian invasion from the east.

Built into the semblance of a world power by the industrial resources acquired in her new empire and by the war-produced decline of the West European powers, Russia continues today as justification for the American permanent war economy. Threatened in reality only by its own superabundance, able to maintain profitable production only on the basis of planned waste and artificial scarcity, the American economy desperately requires an enemy, a threat, of suitable proportions. Russia is the only candidate for this role. It is this (coupled with the need to maintain the regulation of Eastern Europe and the division of Germany) which dictates that Hungary must remain under the yoke of the Kremlin.

Backward Russia cannot support a modern war against the West. She has never even succeeded in digesting the gluttonous mouthful of more advanced society which she bit off in Eastern Europe. She is dominated by *weakness*—weakness which pervades every sphere of consequence and which is now developing such colossal proportions that her total collapse in the near future is a serious possibility. Russian weakness, rather than ability to conduct a war against civilization, is thus the touchstone of Washington policy. And yet we are told by the most "responsible" sources that America was unable to arm the Hungarian freedom fighters because "the argument that the United States could not risk—indeed face the virtual certainty of—a third World War was unanswerable". (*New York Times*, editorial of December 5, 1956.) Because the new line is passed as coin of the purest gold, a closer look at the Russian "threat" is in order.

II

Public "information" on the Stalinist economy, however generously it is dispensed, should be approached with care. Kremlin statistics are notoriously falsified and misleading. And Western "leaders" never tire of further inflating them, of imagining a modern industrial giant lying back of the Potemkin villages shown to Western visitors on guided tour. Mighty Russia is always on the verge of surpassing the "free world"—in nuclear weapons,² submarines, aircraft, atomic power, strategic ores, scientific manpower, pure research, or what have you—depending upon the particular "interests" of the writer. It is possible, nevertheless, to overcome this interested deception. Thus (confirming what the escapee from the "workers' paradise" knows only too well) Professor Warren Nutter reports the following to the American Economic Association: "Soviet industry seems to be roughly three and a half decades behind us in levels of output and about five and a half decades in levels of per capita output. . . . The development of Soviet industry is roughly equivalent to what took place in this country in the four decades bracketing the turn of the century;

² It is worth mentioning that no photographic evidence for the existence of Russian nuclear weapons has ever been presented to the public.

in per capita terms, in an even earlier period ending around the turn of the century. Over the Soviet era as a whole, Soviet industries have generally lost historical ground to their American counterparts—the lags have generally increased—in terms of both total and per capita output. That is, growth from the same level of output, total or per capita, has been slower in Soviet than in American industries. . . . While Soviet industries have tended in recent years to gain ground in terms of total output, they have continued to lose ground in terms of per capita output.” (*New York Times*, December 30, 1956.)

Even this estimate of Russia's economic prowess is too generous. It does not give enough weight to the enormous decline in the *quality* of production, or to the universal waste occurring even in the interval between production and consumption—characteristics endemic to a social system which allows only a select few to extract more than a wretched existence for their labors. Engineers escaped from Eastern Europe report that Russian machinery, most of it copied from Western designs, is poorly engineered,³ shoddily built and incompetently employed. *Fortune* magazine reports that construction of all types is so slovenly that buildings deteriorate rapidly, while tractors in the celebrated collective farm machine stations are under repair more than half the time. The economist Colin Clark finds that the Russian national product per man-hour has declined from about one-third that of the United States in 1900, to about one-fifth in recent years. (Inclusion of slave labor—which may amount to more than ten percent of the labor force—would further depress this ratio.)

Because of the incomparable inefficiency of the Stalinist system, the modest numerical production noted by Nutter has been secured only at frightful human cost. An inordinate proportion of the population—including slave labor, half the entire female population and male conscripts from age fourteen—has been pressed into the labor force. Real wages remain below the level of 1928. Consumers goods, mostly available only to the elite, can often not be had at any price. Living space in Russian cities is less than fifty square feet per person—less than that available in 1913. Per capita meat and milk production are below the 1913 levels. Agriculture remains in a depressed state. (Numerical data from *Fortune*, February 1957.)

The highly monopolized character of her economy drives Russia always toward military production, thus completing and maintaining the general backwardness and social irrationality. Military production—the essence of assured production, production for waste, production least threatened with “lack of markets”—is the desideratum of monopoly *everywhere*. It suppresses general living standards and therefore least proliferates the private interests (middle classes) which are the true enemies of monopoly. For Stalinism it is quintessential in that it fulfills the need for military equipment with which to police a vast empire of oppressed peoples.

The relative backwardness of Russia may be seen when we compare her methods of controlling Eastern Europe with those of Nazi Germany. Germany, forced by the weight of intrinsic antagonisms to try to “organize” the physically contiguous world, planned to reduce the lands she conquered to

³ The level of the Russian “engineer” is more often actually that of a technician. No wonder the Russians are beginning to turn out “so many” of them, as we are constantly reminded these days. The fact is, the American permanent war economy, in its eternal search for “new developments” that will render obsolete its old products, is critically dependent upon highly trained technologists. Since these are, for its purposes, in short supply, government funds to remedy Russian “leadership” in this field are most welcome.

agricultural hinterland—to be henceforth eternal servants and subjects of the German industrial center.⁴ Such a “nice” solution had much to recommend it, and it was also attempted by Russia when the latter assumed the role assigned her in the “great war to save the world from totalitarianism”—the role of *gendarme* of Eastern Europe. But here was a different situation: while Germany was very advanced industrially compared to Eastern Europe, Russian rule found in the captured lands a technological level in general considerably above that of the “workers’ state”. In the end, the more advanced culture conquered, so to speak, the more backward. Unable herself to supply her most desperate material requirements and having urgent need for the technical skills and industrial plant of her new subjects, Russia was compelled to reverse her “plan” and to re-industrialize the satellites—though always in a distorted fashion—rather than to pastoralize them.

III

Russian “planning”, when it is not simply an economic fairy tale, represents only the *modus operandi* of the competitive struggle of production for profit. In the context of blind bureaucratism and chronic scarcity, waste, stupidity, chaos and dislocation vie for supremacy.⁵ Pitchforks for the harvest arrive without handles. Whole shipments of trucks are shanghaied en route. Factories are built without regard for location of materials, labor and markets. Commodities circulate endlessly throughout the country seeking profitable “deals”. The *chastniki*—the indispensable entrepreneurs who operate outside of, in spite of, and against the “plan”—are ubiquitous.

Stalinist rule has never been able to overcome private property in Russia, let alone in the more advanced satellite countries. The collective farmer has always had to be allowed his private plot—the size but not the existence of which fluctuates according to the fortunes of the perpetual war which rages between regime and peasantry. Private craftsmen and tradesmen, and operators of small industrial enterprises (employing several, often even scores, of workmen), have never been eliminated. The bungling, over-centralized state industry, “planned” by those who have nothing to do with production and distribution, operating at the dictates of opportunity (which is the case of *all* production dominated by scarcity), could never supply the solvable needs of the masses or of itself. Private enterprise consequently pours into the countless economic lacunae and cements the economy at the bottom. As an expression of this reality, free markets have never disappeared from the Stalinist economy. Connections between state industry and private suppliers are less obvious, but necessarily exist, especially where quality and flexibility of production are essential.

During the Second World War political control over the Kremlin’s domain was considerably relaxed under the impact of the German attack. The private sectors of the economy revived in proportion as emergency needs rose and state production and distribution were disrupted. Only the free market saved Russian cities from starvation. The threads of economic connection between

⁴ The Morgenthau plan for Germany strove in the same direction. Because of her still relatively democratic political structure, however, America was unable to muster the permanent and barbaric peacetime force required for the reduction to primitive status of an advanced nation.

⁵ See “State Capitalism In Russia”, by M. S. Shiloh, *Contemporary Issues*, Number 7.

state producers and private suppliers were woven more tightly. And the new opportunities and incentives opened during the war could not but oppose restoration of the leaden chains of bureaucratic control. After the war, positions won by private production were never entirely recaptured by the state apparatus. As Russia entered upon a more rapid industrial development and the dislocations generated by the blindness of the system increased, the role played by private production could only grow.

Allied economically to private production is the light industrial, primarily consumer goods, sector of state production. Whereas heavy industry (mainly armaments production) is identified with monopolized, centralized production and with the state surplus extractive machinery, light industry must seek to develop greater public purchasing power, new private needs, new private interests. One may say categorically that Russian light industry, once it begins to sense its possibilities, desires nothing in this world more than the opportunity to "make money"—to do unlimited business in the "normal" capitalist sense. It is, therefore, the "liberal" wing of the Russian regime—advocate of a "soft" policy on consumer goods production, more political democracy, easing of international tensions and trade restrictions, increased freedom for the satellites. Against all better wisdom on the part of heavy industry and the political apparatus of the state, the expansion of industry in general requires also the growth of light industry to provide for the needs and luxuries of the state functionaries and technologists and for the higher material level of life necessitated by a functioning urbanization and industrialization. Light industry carries weight in the councils of state because private producers, collective farmers and the oppressed urban masses stand behind its demands. In the captive nations of Eastern Europe where the cultural level and standards of consumption are generally higher and where the powerful fuel of national oppression feeds the flames of popular struggle for reform, the liberal element is strong indeed.

One can only imagine the strenuous measures taken by the state political apparatus during the past decade to deal with the rising liberal movement. The constant purges are well known. Very likely the Korean war was prolonged in order to provide the proper emergency atmosphere for quashing nascent "liberalism".⁶ It is known that the Korean war occasioned drastic cutbacks of consumer production in Russia and in the satellites in favor of more armaments. But all attempts to preserve the *Gleichschaltung* of backwardness and scarcity fly in the face of elemental human needs, which can never be overcome, and which have been remorselessly undermining Kremlin rule throughout the "Communist" era. Resistance has been substantially reinforced by the developing industrialization, which has given birth to powerful new independent interests and to the perspective of a "way out" based upon a more sensible utilization of the attained material wealth. Thus, rather than "planning" its way to mastery of the world, the crushingly artificial political structure has preserved and developed within itself strong antagonists, to the point where the empire has become a great social centrifuge. It remained only for the economic disproportions to reach a certain quantitative condition to

⁶ One is hard put to explain on other grounds the extreme prolongation of this planned, well-controlled war. While the "benefits" to the West (especially to America) of consolidating the permanent war economy and of carrying out the assault on the institutions of political democracy which are so inconsonant with the fascist requirements of the economy are clear, it must be borne in mind that two sides were needed in order to drag out the interminable futilities of that "conflict".

bring matters to a head, for the masses to say: "Now we have had enough!", thus providing that magic propeller which has swept the Russian empire with the wind of "de-Stalinization".

The immediate cause of the general crisis now evident throughout the Kremlin's domain is the depression of the state capitalist economy. The Polish crisis, for example, reflects all the frailties of the Stalinist "planned" economy: new plants constructed without provision for materials to be processed, armaments industries strangling consumer production, falling coal production due to antiquated machinery, grain shortages due to failure of collective farm deliveries, and so on. Everywhere the decline in living standards has reached the common denominator of unbearability. The economic crisis has unleashed a political crisis (which takes on particularly sharp form in the satellite countries). This has in turn, through slowdown, strike, sabotage and revolt, deepened the economic crisis beyond any chance of resolution within the near future.

IV

The maturing opposition to Kremlin rule will not easily be dissipated. It cannot be crushed in another bloodbath like the collectivization orgy of the 1930's. Neither can the Stalinist system satisfy its demands. The Kremlin can only seek to placate the opposition with concessions and keep it in tow on a provisional basis, as with the Gomulka experiment in Poland.

For purely local reasons the physical fight for freedom developed first in Hungary. Though using a large portion of its available military force and suffering heavy material losses (including, some escapees estimate, 700 tanks in Budapest alone), the Kremlin has been able to retain only an uneasy domination. For a period of months workers councils' called strikes whenever Russian rule overstepped the limits of its shaky control. No amount of selective bribery was able to break these strikes. The struggle for liberation continually spawned new spokesmen to fill the shoes of those incarcerated or murdered. A unity of interests unknown since the primitive commune organized essential services in the midst of the chaos of struggle. Food processing was maintained at all times; peasants even fed strikers free of charge!

With hopes of Western aid shattered, open warfare in Hungary has subsided and the heroic nation must await a more general uprising in Eastern Europe. Exhaustion has given the Kremlin the upper hand. But the workers' councils have resigned rather than become tools of the regime. Mining and industry remain at a standstill. And in the Hungarian countryside the collective farm is a thing of the past. The Russian overlords have reconquered Hungary militarily, but they are unable to organize life again on their basis. It requires more than tanks to draw together the threads of social control.

In Poland, as in Hungary, the collective farm system has collapsed. Production falters. The country is riddled with strikes and demonstrations of solidarity with the Hungarians, with anti-Russian and anti-Stalinist riots, with approval of Gomulka for his accomplishments and cold hate for his temporizings. Party cells disintegrate; provincial officials are turned out to pasture. The "integrated" economy of the entire Stalinist empire suffers when Poland is no longer able to export coal (or anything else). Russian imperialism must reverse itself, drain its own substance, in order to keep the satellite economy afloat.

In all the satellite countries Russian rule becomes daily more undermined as the opposition grows more conscious of its own existence, of its universally

united interests, of the true dimensions of Russian weakness. The national uprising in Hungary has replaced volumes of analysis and years of painful experience on this score, and has given the movement a new character. The Kremlin must now weigh each move against the mushrooming popular animosity. In East Germany the greatest concentration of Russian military might in existence seeks to prevent the population from taking the inevitable step. In the Baltic countries (which have old scores to settle) and in the Balkans the mastery of the regime is also threatened.⁷

In Russia itself, momentous events are taking place. The indomitable Ukrainian resistance is reviving. Ukrainian partisans are operating with Hungarians and Slovaks in the Carpathian mountains and Ukrainian army units have been reported in combat with Russian troops. A student rebellion has shaken Kiev. Elsewhere—in Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals, the Donets—strikes lasting days and weeks occur. Even Moscow University, where every careerist-to-be in Russia goes to learn his trade, had to be closed for a day and has had many students removed. The highest officials—Khrushchev, Shepilov, Furtseva—encounter audience antipathy at public speeches (the last named barely escaped injury).

The desperate character of the crisis, the fact that relaxation of exploitation of the masses is the only possible workable policy, has been openly acknowledged by changes in the personnel and "plans" of the State Commission for Current Planning. Large cutbacks in capital investment and decreased centralization are promised. It is now officially conceded that plan and practice have often been widely separated, that shortages and dislocations are crippling production, that the satellite economies have become a drain on the Russian, that production and capital investment programs have not corresponded to available material resources, that housing is in terribly short supply.

Things are very much out of hand on the other side of the "iron" curtain. The material substance at the disposition of the tyrants is dwindling. The masses are forcing the planners to plan a new "plan" every other day. Shoring up the situation with concessions and "Titoist" regimes satisfies only incompletely the needs of the aroused and unified oppressed peoples, while it encourages them to press their demands further still.

V

Against the rising tide of rebellion the effectiveness of the Russian army is very much in doubt. More a migrant horde than a disciplined fighting force, it could defeat little Finland only by its overwhelming numerical superiority. It was able to push back the German army only after the Nazis had embittered the entire civilian population (which originally welcomed the Germans as liberators) by retention of the Stalinist system, and only with enormous American material aid.

The "modernness" of Russian armed might was well demonstrated in Hungary. The logistics operation was incompetent to keep the army supplied with food. (Incidents were even reported where a tank was sold for a loaf of bread!) Because of the wretched military communications even "loyal"

⁷ By no means the least volatile of the Balkan countries is Yugoslavia, where American funds openly maintain in power one of the great barbaric Stalinist regimes of the age. More than \$1,500,000,000 have thus been expended in the cause of "freedom and justice".

Russian units often engaged one another in battle. The striking fact that the Russian air force was virtually absent from the Hungarian fighting suggests—despite the great Moscow air shows which, when reported upon by freedom-minded United States Air Force generals, easily extract billions from equally freedom-minded Congressmen—that the airplanes not used simply do not exist. (Regarding the quality of Russian planes, the record of the air war in Korea speaks clearly: 800 Russian MIG-15 jet fighter planes, as against 58 American Sabre-jets, were shot down in air-to-air combat.)

The Russian army is kept intact by terror and demoralization. The questioning soldier is shot down by his political officer. His “loyalty” evaporates at the sight of Western commodities and Western freedoms; whole regiments have been deported to Siberia upon return from service in Germany and Austria, where they were infected with “reactionary” aspirations. For this reason alone Russia could never wage war against the West. Her army would simply dissolve. This is probably the main reason for her leaving Austria. And were it not for the grim necessity to maintain the division of Germany, the Kremlin would doubtless be delighted also to end the East German occupation.

In Hungary the original Russian garrison put up only a half-hearted fight against their neighbors of many months, had to be replaced, and by the thousands fought their replacements. Russian soldiers willingly turned over arms to the freedom fighters—especially when a few draughts of brandy were thrown into the bargain. Long after the major fighting had ended and only guerilla activities were still maintained, one read of mutinies and of small Russian units joining the Hungarian resistance.

What the Russian soldier “likes” about his job is only the relief it affords him from the grinding burden of collective farm quotas and factory norms. As often as not himself a member of an oppressed national group, he fights only when he has no alternative. A general uprising in Eastern Europe would win the Russian soldier over to the side of the captive peoples. From them he would take the torch of liberation into the very halls of the Kremlin. This was the real potential of the Hungarian freedom fight which was so *feared* in Washington.

VI

The impending collapse of the Russian empire heralds the end of the Cold War. But this prospect does not sit well with the privileged minority of official and industrial rulers of the Western world. The possibilities opened by the broadening struggle for freedom from Stalinism have so frightened this minority that, not content with betraying every responsibility to aid the Hungarian uprising, they have felt compelled to do something really “positive” for Eastern Europe.

In mid-December, spokesman for the minority John Foster Dulles and his kept entourage of Western statesmen assembled in Paris for a NATO conference. At this time the spirit of revolt in Eastern Europe was at a high point: Hungary was witnessing the greatest strikes in history and guerrilla warfare was erupting everywhere; unrest was sweeping Eastern Europe; revolt in East Germany and Poland was expected momentarily. In this pregnant atmosphere the good gentlemen of NATO proclaimed to the world that, for their part, “The internal development of the countries of Eastern Europe shall not be influenced by military force or threats or by economic or political

pressure". So that there would be no chance for misunderstanding, "NATO officials emphasized that the declaration is a Western statement of policy designed to quiet fears in Russia that the West is preparing to launch an attack to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe". (Associated Press, December 13, 1956.) Of course, the Kremlin gang had long known that no help for the oppressed would be forthcoming from the West. But those who had listened avidly to Radio Free Europe might be more naïve. The public declaration by the combined Western powers could serve only one purpose: to let the victims themselves know that they stand alone, to discourage any further attempts to overthrow their masters.

As justification for their final, monumental betrayal of all principles of "liberty" and "justice" the Western statesmen have drawn upon the soundest principles of modern psychology. They have explained that there is "great danger" in the deterioration of the Kremlin's power—that if the once "coldly-calculating" dictators are pushed to the wall they might become "nervous" and "frustrated" (also, presumably: schizophrenic, paranoid and manic-depressive) and, in an act of "pure desperation", destroy civilization with nuclear explosives.⁸ But the new robes have been donned too quickly for those who took seriously the old lines about the Russian military "threat" and the American policy of "liberation". The *New York Post*, apparently incredulous at the declarations arriving over its teletype, editorialized in deep consternation: "So we have come almost full cycle. Once it was the menace of Soviet might that was supposed to paralyze America. Now we are to be immobilized by the specter of Russian weakness. This new nightmare reduces American policy to absurdity. . . . If the logic of these present fears were carried to its inevitable conclusion, only one policy could result. We would be doing all we could to restore Russian strength and to crush the Hungarian rebellion . . . Is Mr. Dulles really proposing that we reverse all the processes of history just when the light of liberty is beginning to pierce the Communist dungeons?" (December 27, 1956.)

This is, of course, precisely what Mr. Dulles is proposing. The threat of "pure" Russian desperation is *pure* Washington duplicity, aimed at prolonging the Cold War through facilitating the continuation of the Kremlin's power. The simple secret of America's conduct is that she is in mortal danger of losing her last "enemy". With Stalinism gone, the present "world arrangement" would collapse. All the bitter Second World War policies would be undone. Above all, there would cease to be any justification for the ever-expanding permanent war economy.

The West in general, and America in particular, has reached the *cul-de-sac* of production for the sake of production. Rendered grotesquely irrational

⁸ The "problem" of universal nuclear destruction is best left to those Western "leaders" who themselves place such reliance upon that *deus ex machina* of subjective reason—the nuclear weapon. But the gravity with which this argument is taken demands some comment. If the Russian rulers have been able to organize a totalitarian society they have necessarily seen to it that the machinery of state is "organized" to prevent all untoward accidents. The war machine cannot move without a high degree of consensus among the rulers. Desperate measures are taken only as last alternatives and only when some class objective is thereby served. (Thus, with all their preparations for poison gas and bacteriological warfare, the Nazis were never able to use them, in spite of Hitler's "personal" power, "madness" and "death instinct".) Large layers of the ruling class of Russia and their supporting echelons throughout the state apparatus do have alternatives. They are acutely aware of the vast internal market starved for consumer goods, and they want to "do business". In short, the social consensus required for desperate measures does not exist in Russia.

by the unchecked development of competition and monopoly, Western capitalism sinks deeper and deeper into the quicksand of armaments production. At the same time, the flowering and maturation of technology during the twentieth century have, for the first time, made material abundance available. Abundance is at present withheld from society not by the adamancy of nature but only by a competitive social organization—once necessary, now become superfluous—which strives to maintain artificially those conditions of scarcity and need without which production for profit and minority rule must perish.

The Hungarian freedom fight has opened a new era, in which the Russian *gendarme* and the Cold War are losing their force as instruments for taming the masses. The threads of social control are slipping through the hands of the masters. If the Cold War, which for a decade has succeeded in blocking all social progress, comes to an end, the way would then be clear for a general consciousness of the bankruptcy of the competitive system and of the power politics through which an incredibly tiny minority manipulates all humanity. The clearer the air becomes in Eastern Europe, the more clearly contrived become the Cold War and the Russian "threat", the more isolated become the American monopolists (who are the real rulers of the world) and their international consorts. The more the political initiative passes into the hands of humanity at large, the nearer society advances to the practical rational solution of the social question.

March 1, 1957

J. M.

IS THE UNITED STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT IS NOW HAPPENING IN HUNGARY?*

"We can never rest—and we must so inform the world, including the Kremlin—that until the enslaved nations of the world have the fullness of freedom, the right to choose their own path, that then and only then can we say that here is a possible way of living peacefully with communism in the world. We must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands who seeks refuge with us, any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of freedom or is dedicated to the liberation of his fellow men."

Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 25, 1952, as quoted in the *N.Y. Daily Mirror*, November 23, 1956.

THE answer to this momentous question is YES.

Many of us Americans will of course ask, *why?* Why should *we* be involved and implicated in this bloody tragedy which, at first sight, is essentially a conflict between the Soviet enslavers and their Hungarian victims striving to achieve their freedom and independence? Why should we bear any part of the responsibility for what the Soviets are doing to Hungary, for Soviet crimes,

* The following article was written by an American-Hungarian participant in the work of the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary.

for the unspeakable tortures, all the violence and coercion to which they are subjecting a whole nation? Did not our President himself state in a recent press conference that he and his administration have never advocated a "physical" uprising of an unarmed populace against overwhelming military might? Why then should we Americans be responsible for the Hungarian uprising and its tragic consequences?

It is only right that we should ask these questions, trying to find the proper answers, before admitting any guilt or accepting any blame and responsibility for these horrible things which are not of our making, to which we are opposed, and which we have condemned and repudiated with all the power and all the sincerity of our hearts and of our consciences.

Let us see then what should be the answer, considered in the correct historical perspective and under the searchlight of historical truth and unprejudiced objectivity.

The basic reasons why we Americans are inescapably implicated in this bloody tragedy go back to the peace treaties of Paris of 1946 which put an end to World War II, as well as to the various wartime agreements (Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam) which we had concluded with the Soviets regarding the future of those European countries which are now known as the Soviet satellites.

In these agreements we and our British allies had, in effect, placed these countries and their civilized peoples under the domination of the backward Russian people and their bloodthirsty bolshevik tyrants. Why did we do this? Was there any valid political or other reason for throwing over 100 million civilized Europeans (East Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians) under the tyrannic rule of a monstrous cannibal? The answer here is, NO. There was in fact no such reason whatsoever. During the war the bolshevik tyrants, with the German knife at their throats, were in no position to dictate any conditions to us and to our allies. Why then did we commit this horrible blunder, this appalling crime against the most elementary precepts of humanity and international decency? The answer to this remains a mystery upon which some light might be shed later when the true motives are revealed of those who, behind the scenes, were pulling the strings and were influencing these disastrous actions of our allies and ourselves. Whatever the motives may have been, the actuality of this senseless crime exists and with it our full responsibility for it, and its ghastly consequences.

We were, of course, parties and co-signatories to the peace treaties concluded in 1946 with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and we thus are fully responsible for the observance and implementation of their provisions. These treaties guaranteed to all the above-named countries, and specifically to Hungary, the right to complete national independence, to the free choice of its system of government through free and unfettered elections and to its own way of life as an equal member of the family of nations.

What did we do to insure the exercise of these basic rights and the fulfilment of all the other provisions of these treaties to which we were party? We did exactly *nothing*. On the contrary, as late as 1948, we tolerated and condoned the seizure of governmental power in all these lands by Moscow-trained and Moscow-dominated cliques of bolshevik puppets lacking the slightest popular support and against the clearly expressed wishes of these peoples. We have tolerated the overthrow, by the use of foreign force, of freely-elected democratic governments and their replacement by foreign-directed, ruthless totalitarian dictatorships. In other words, we have pitifully failed to fulfil our contractual obligations embodied in international treaties.

The question then is: Does this failure to fulfil our obligations make us responsible for present and possible future consequences, particularly with respect to Hungary? Again the inescapable answer seems to be: YES, it does make us FULLY RESPONSIBLE.

Recently we have been confronted with a rather pitiful excuse for shunning our responsibilities on the grounds that we have never advocated "physical" uprisings against overwhelming military might. Such an excuse is clearly designed to explain away our failure to effectively help the revolutionary movement of the Hungarian people by denying every responsibility for its start. Arguments could, no doubt, be given pro and con regarding this question. In Europe and in the satellites themselves it appears to be generally held that, during the past 10 years, we did incite to forceful resistance through various private, semi-official and official media, through broadcasts, balloons, messages etc. However, this is not quite the point. The truth is that the Hungarian revolution did not explode because of American incitements and, under the circumstances, it would probably have exploded even if we had not encouraged it at all. The explosion occurred with the barbarous massacre by Soviet tanks of over 700 peaceful demonstrators, including women and children, in Parliament Square on October 23, 1956. These are well-known facts and it is therefore childish and unworthy of our great nation to seek such an excuse for not in any way helping the victims of overt military aggression. Here the question arises: Should we have aided the uprising even though its explosion may not have been a direct consequence of our propagandistic activities behind the Iron Curtain? The answer to this question must be left to the conscience of every individual American in accordance with the moral and political principles in which he believes. There is little doubt what this answer must be. President Eisenhower himself expressed this so forcefully and so convincingly in one of his campaign speeches in 1952, quoted at the beginning of this article. "We must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands who seek refuge with us, any man who keeps burning among his own people the flame of freedom or is dedicated to the liberation of his fellow men".

If such is our American answer to the brutal oppression by the Soviets of the enslaved peoples of Central Europe, then we may ask with good reason, how far should this aid go? It should, of course, be moral and spiritual, it should also be humanitarian and charitable. But beyond this, it should be political and diplomatic through the United Nations and other channels. And it should be military aid should such a necessity arise when it appears impossible to check the aggressor by other means.

At this point a touchy problem is injected into the debate: Should we eventually run the risk of a Third World War with Soviet Russia for the sake of helping a relatively small European nation to win its fight for freedom against the Soviet tyrants? Characteristically, this question is being asked most of the time by those who seem to be fearful of an early total collapse of the Soviet system and are intent, for reasons of their own, upon maintaining, at least temporarily, Soviet domination over the satellites. It is impossible to appraise with absolute certainty in the present explosive world situation whether a military intervention in Hungary or in any other part of the world by the United Nations or by some of its members would or would not provide the spark for a general conflagration. It appears to be a safe assumption that, considering the Soviets' formidable difficulties in the satellites and in their own homeland, despite their bluffing to the contrary, they have no intention

of becoming implicated in a general war at this moment. However, if we allow ourselves to be blackmailed into cowardly inaction and shameful submission by Soviet threats of starting a general war, then we should realize that, in effect, we are playing the Soviets' game and are merely postponing an explosion thereby permitting the Soviets to better prepare themselves for future aggressions against other nations within their sphere of influence or outside it.

There are others among us who take an even graver view of the moral and political issues at stake and our failure to discharge clearcut moral and contractual obligations resulting from the Hungarian crisis. Dean James A. Pike of the New York cathedral of St. John the Divine, told a congregation of over 2,000 people in a sermon delivered on November 11th: "We are for the freedom of Hungary to the last Hungarian. I am not sure we should have taken on Russia in order to free the satellite states, but short of that intention we should have kept our mouths shut. Prayer without any intention of action, in light of the years of our having encouraged such revolts abroad, will not clear our consciences. The blood of the Hungarians is on our hands. We have encouraged them to continue in their thirst for freedom, but when they rise up we are able to say only, good luck!"

From these statements and many others it is quite clear that we do bear a heavy share of responsibility for the acts of brutal aggression and repression undertaken in Hungary and elsewhere by the armed forces and murder squads of the Soviet Union and their local stooges. To shun this responsibility at this stage and turn our backs on the victims by continuing diplomatic and economic relations with those whom we have rightly recognized and branded as mass murderers, is equivalent to condoning their crimes and becoming their accomplices.

Much more is involved than just the immediate fate of Hungary. The Soviets know this only too well and it is giving them the jitters. They are spreading all sorts of falsehoods, trying to brand the Hungarian revolution as a fascist plot joined by only a few misled workers and students. They are trying hard to persuade themselves and others that the real danger was that this alleged plot would become the rallying point for a resurgent fascist movement all over Europe.

Do the Soviets really believe what they are saying about the fascist character of the uprising? Of course not. They know very well from their own experience what this uprising really means. They clearly saw the handwriting on the wall. As Milovan Djilas, formerly a close collaborator of Tito, put it in a recent article: The Hungarian revolution means in fact the end of communism not only in Hungary but in all the satellites; not only of the "stalinist" brand of communism, but of all other brands as well. Far from being a plot of a small group of fascists who could easily be defeated, the Hungarian revolution was and is an uprising of the broadest popular kind against the utterly bankrupt communist system itself. It is a combined and concentrated upsurge of all the popular strata of the Hungarian nation: workers and miners, farmers on state collectives and individual peasants, intellectuals, artists and writers, civil servants and teachers, socialists as well as non-socialists, students of the high schools and universities, and the men and officers of the Hungarian army itself. The fact is that this revolution is a deadly danger for communism not because it is a fascist uprising but exactly because it is *not* a mere fascist plot. This is a momentous fact of which the Soviets are fully aware and would like to conceal because it means a death warrant for their system and for themselves. The danger of contagion is great and of incalculable consequences.

This also explains the blind fury with which they have reacted in ordering the mass murder of tens of thousands of civilians without any discrimination, the wanton destruction of entire cities, industrial plants and anything else that could be destroyed by gunfire. They know very well that this barbarous massacre cannot end the revolution, that the Hungarian population remains irreconcilably opposed to their system and their presence in the country. They ordered the massacres and deportations as an act of helpless fury and Asiatic vengeance on those who frustrated their designs of permanently enslaving and exploiting whole nations for the sole benefit of a handful of utterly corrupt and bankrupt criminals constituting the Soviet leadership.

It is sad to note that at this very moment an ill-concealed attempt seems under way on the part of our officialdom to let the Hungarian revolution "spend itself". The dubious theory underlying this policy is that the Hungarian uprising and its tremendous world-wide repercussions have created a serious strain in Soviet-American relations and that this strain can only be eliminated by appeasing the Soviets. If we leave the Soviets full freedom of action to handle the Hungarian ulcer, so the theory goes, then we may get some temporary respite at this time and hope of a permanent settlement later on. There are many signs that this is the dominant idea behind all our nice but empty words spoken in the United Nations leading invariably to repeated delays and postponements of the Hungarian issue, thus encouraging and enabling the Soviets to complete their designs of "pacification" through mass extermination.

Should this be the American way of getting rid of a troublesome problem? It is hardly believable and yet the evidence appears *conclusive*. Such a course, if permitted to continue, would not only be morally inconceivable and utterly monstrous, but given the prevailing conditions in Hungary, it could never succeed. We must realize that the whole Hungarian population is completely united in its resistance against the cannibalistic system of the Soviets. This united will cannot be broken by a repetition of the recent massacres. Should the Soviets, in utter despair, resort to renewed slaughter shall we again stand idly by sending the heroic Hungarians more cheers, more penicillin, more food parcels for their unique courage? Are we unable to realize that this problem is assuming historical proportions, raising moral issues on which the very future of civilized relations among men depends?

As thinking human beings we cannot fail to realize all this. We must see our duty clearly to ourselves and to all humanity and draw the lines here and now. As one of the leading nations on this planet we must assume and discharge our responsibilities to the cause of freedom, of justice and our democratic way of life. We must be bold and unstinting in the face of all threats and bluffs from that dark power who, without any scruples whatsoever, would plunge the whole world, including ourselves, into the darkness of totalitarian tyranny and endless suffering.

No one should expect us to be the policemen of the entire world, but wherever the dignity of man, vital principles and our very honor are being challenged we must act promptly and effectively. It is untrue that we can do nothing but seek strong condemnation in the United Nations of an act of wanton military aggression coupled with mass murder, deportations and other crimes. We can do much more than that. We *can* give the Hungarian people prompt and effective help. We *must* give it in order to save our own souls and our own lives.

November, 1956

SEEN FROM THE EAST*

WE have not come empty-handed after eleven years of waiting—we have brought the hope and promise of freedom to a Europe overawed by the thought of slavery. The sacrificed lives of our fellow-fighters and the heroism of our fellow workers both on the barricades and recently in the returning days of misery and oppression have secured that hope and promise.

We arrived full of plans and expectation and now stand perplexed on the stations, never before seen but always longed for, of the free and wealthy West.

In the first few weeks of searching we have met with many disappointments. We were dumbfounded, because materially and emotionally we received much more than we could hope for—and disillusioned in our national and political expectations. We cannot see clearly yet; even well-informed politicians find difficulty in disentangling the web of opposing interests. But we see more and more explicitly the differences between the factual position and the truth imagined by us.

We, in Hungary, had been anticipating freedom since the last years of the war. After securing success in Italy (in 1944), Churchill, then British Prime Minister, gave the speech in which he first mentioned the good chances of victory. He summed up the successes of the Allied forces and gave hints of a planned attack on the vulnerable South-Eastern part of Europe—which meant the liberation of the states of Eastern Europe from Hitler's might. Public feeling in Hungary at that time was characterised by a hatred of war, an awakening spirit of resistance under the weight of foreign domination, and, at the same time, by a fear of the Soviet. We knew the war was lost. The only perspective for Hungary was: defeat and occupation by the Allied forces. Dalmatia and the Greek coast offered themselves for the action against the spiritually broken Eastern European countries where the Western armies could expect more help than resistance. An attack from the Balkans could have shortened the war by many months since the Hungarian troops who were later to fight against the Eastern attackers in Transylvania, on the Plain, in Budapest, and in the last strong-holds of Western Hungary, were ready to take up a passive attitude in the event of an Allied attack. This way out, on which the Hungarian leaders based all their policies, was closed after the Yalta conference. Up till then, Hungary had been trying to counter-balance the disadvantages of her geographical position by political moves, i.e., sabotaging the actual participation in the war. This attitude was prompted by sober thinking. That the war would be lost was obvious, and our national interests would not have been secured even in the case of a victorious war. Active resistance to Hitler would have brought a much earlier subjugation of the country; there was no choice left but passive resistance. This Hungarian policy was viewed with a certain amount of recognition by the Allies at that time—and the country awaited the liberators—from the West. But instead Yalta came, and with it also the Stettin-Trieste line: with that the West gave us up and tacitly sent us into the Soviet orbit. Stalin founded his claim to these territories on

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the apology that in order to secure safety, the Soviet Union required a defence belt, and President Roosevelt acknowledged the Soviet Union's desire, i.e., to have "friendly governments in her neighbouring lands"—as it was nicely expressed then, as justifiable. Stalin made sure of having "friendly" governments from Stettin to Trieste, and East of that line; all he required was a few dozen divisions, a few hundred leading National Bolsheviks recruited from N.K.V.D. officers in Moscow, and *the assistance of the West*.

Since then, the Stettin-Trieste line has been named the Iron Curtain, and the friendly belt of the Soviet Union is called contemptuously, the satellites. There was a pretended shock all over the world when, a couple of years after the war, open Bolshevik régimes were established in these countries. Cultured Western democrats have stated (shaking their heads disapprovingly) that those Eastern Europeans do not seem capable of founding human, democratic systems. Not once have I been told by Western friends: "Why do you complain? In the war you were Nazis, now you have become Bolsheviks. We have more right to charge you with this, you haven't got a leg to stand on!" Arguments were useless; ordinary citizens in the West were not informed or else mis-informed, and the politicians kept quiet with their bad consciences.

1950 brought an era of criticism and attack against the Soviet's satellite policy, and the open colonization of Europe. The people of the satellites suddenly became the "lovers of freedom" (so called by those who had sanctioned the loss of their freedom in writing) and were urged from all directions to break their chains, and tear down the Iron Curtain unrolled across Europe at Yalta. There were many who, foolishly, credulously, or even without false illusions but fired by hatred of oppression, attempted to fight in those countries by all possible means for national and human aims. There *were* many—since they have already died, on the gallows, or shot in the back of the head, or from starvation in the cellars of the M.V.D., or have perished somewhere in Chukch land, or in the Vorkuta mines. (Tens of thousands still exist in slums, mines, prisons, in the woods of Miskolc and Bakony, waiting. . . .)

Stalin died in 1953, and the world readily believed Malenkov, and later Bulganin and Khrushchev, to the effect that everything the Soviet Union could be accused of was the handiwork of the dead despot, but now begins a new era, co-existence, living in peace together. The West was obviously breathing more easily; the citizens slept better, politicians settled down for bright and lengthy discussions, and industry began to count on the Soviet market again.

Meanwhile, in the "turmas" and "katorgans" * millions of different categories of slaves of the system were robots still, and perishing behind the Urals; hundreds of thousands "only" in the satellites. Of course, the system instituted "reliefs": private persons were allowed to repair boots again, and a few notorious concentration camps were shut down. Adjectives such as "freedom-lovers" became scarcer on Western radio-stations. Sometimes even moderation in the resistance was suggested. The world (the people) perhaps really believed in possible peaceful co-existence in 1954-5—but did the arbiters of the fate of the world believe in it? The Geneva spirit reigned; opera companies, scientists, parliamentary delegations, hovered between Moscow and other capitals. Of course, the material of the Geneva discussions was not published: it too was placed with the Yalta files. We sat beyond the Iron Curtain, and tried to orient ourselves by the glimmers of light filtering through gaps in that curtain here and there. We could not feel easier about the '54-5 consolida-

* Different categories of forced-labour camps. *Trans.*

tion; the very idea of co-existence, even the thought that this more lenient situation might become permanent, weighed more heavily on us than the consequences of the terror.

It is horrible to live in a cage—but to co-exist enclosed in that cage with a huge, wicked beast is impossible. We were more than ever afraid, because we knew that there is no chance of agreement, there is no common road with bolshevism. “Yes”—and “we” stand confronting each other: we or they. To recognise this no political acumen or special training is needed.

While Khrushchev laughingly supplied the headlines of the Western press with plans for the co-existence of capitalism and bolshevism, the party literature openly pacified the disturbed membership, saying that all this was only elastic, Leninist tactics; the fight to achieve a proletarian international; and that world bolshevism was still the order of the day.

Eventually, summer 1956 arrived, when a few thousand suffering, poverty-stricken Polish workers (who obviously had not read Western papers and did not know that they ought to co-exist) dared to face Soviet machine-guns, unable to endure any more physical and spiritual oppression by the system.

These were sparks in Poland, but the kindling flames were beaten out with the help of Soviet tanks and Polish renegades. A few months later, on October 23rd, the fire engulfed everything in Budapest. The Polish affair provided precedents, and even the bloodiness of that example did not restrain the youth, educated by bolsheviks for ten years, or the workers, in whose name they governed, from hurling themselves unarmed, without hesitation, at the Soviet tanks. When the first T. 54's were burned by 12—14 year-old children, every newspaper, every radio-station, and every political leader in the world enthusiastically acclaimed the heroes who were about to smash the prisons built at Yalta in 1944 for about 100 million Europeans. This enthusiasm seemed unanimous and forceful. Everyone was encouraging us to fight; we became new crusaders, heroes of freedom, of Europe, of humanity. And what help did the world, or Europe, give to its heroes? During the fight, a few radio-stations gave excellent military and political information, boosting the determination of the fighters—and always transmitting the false idea that the owners of the stations (who are not private individuals) would support and help them so as to achieve and preserve freedom. By this, they immediately prevented Nagy from, like Gomulka, seeking and finding a *modus vivendi*, co-existence with the Soviet. This was all the concrete help that the Hungarian freedom-fighters received from outside—if one can call this help. Meanwhile, endless meetings were going on at U.N.O., with resolutions that were never to be put into practice, with wavering absent-minded discussions between Hammerskjöld and the Hungarian government, which, in the end, lacking enough courage and determination, they had to recognise.

One can ask: What did we expect, or could we expect? The naïve masses, trusting the West blindly, wanted definite diplomatic action, an ultimatum and intervention; the more sober and the pessimists hoped for political and economic sanctions at least, sanctions so often mentioned in international forums. What has happened since then, in the last three months?

Nothing.

A few groups of well-meaning but “mis-informed” dockers refused to handle Soviet goods—since then, these “reluctants” have also conformed to rule. The Governments dried up their tears and today carry out their existing obligations with the Soviet Union.

It was declared at different levels (of course, not officially) that it would be

beneficial to keep the spirit of the Hungarian insurrection alive. At the same time, Mr. Dulles—getting up after his illness—hastily pacified the Soviet Union, saying that they (America) had no political or military aspirations in Eastern Europe, and declared (probably to satisfy the freedom-fighters) that he would like to see governments of friendly disposition towards the Soviet in those countries. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, spoke resignedly about the “collective suicide of a nation”. More and more people voiced opinions in the world press, saying that Gomulka was right, not we Hungarians, who embarrass the whole world by obstinately insisting on dying for the ideals that the West professes to hold. But what is the use. We could speak only in a bitter and sarcastic tone, which would be bad manners.

We stand here, now, dispersed over three continents, and still not understanding things. It seems that the ten to fifteen years in which we lived separated from Europe, made us incapable of understanding the more advanced democratic and human Western attitudes and political leadership. We know, at least we think so, what has happened and is happening, but we cannot follow its logic. If we start thinking according to our undeveloped and uncouth logic, we come to very very sad conclusions, and would have to pass a very bitter judgment.

Yet we hope that soon we shall see everything in a different light, after waking from the enforced darkness of Eastern jails, and we shall realize that we were mistaken. It cannot be possible that the people of five continents, who have all fought for freedom in history, and who wish to live free today, should leave us in peril, when we fight not only for our own lives, but for the freedom of all peoples of the world.

Birds of a Father

East Berlin.—Report from a top Red source: The Soviet Government has ordered reopening of all slave-labor camps in Siberia and other parts of the U.S.S.R. New use: To imprison Hungarians and anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic states as well as Russian counterrevolutionaries.

Vienna.—The Austrian Government has a list of 30,000 clandestine civilian AVO (secret police) agents in Hungary, according to diplomatic sources here. The list includes many professional men. Why not release the names to the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe? It's feared such a move would touch off a new wave of violence in Hungary.

(*Newsweek*, January 7, 1957)

MATERIAL AND DOCUMENTS ON THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT — *An Interim Report*

INTRODUCTION, by Giacomo Troiano

IT is natural that those powers which have a preeminent interest in the destructive "achievements" of the two world wars should oppose the recent developments in Hungary and in Eastern Europe generally. Concerned here of course are the Russian totalitarians. Concerned also, and this is the second keystone of the present world edifice, is the United States, which, out of the destruction of Austria-Hungary in the first War and of Germany in the second, out of the partition of Europe and the destruction of the French and English East-European influence-spheres, has become paramount among the capitalist and the state-capitalist powers of the world. The American world hegemony is based on the existence of the Russian empire in Eastern Europe, which perpetuates that paralysis of Europe which leaves America supreme: this fundamental political reality undercuts all the cold-war propaganda, and alone can account for the otherwise mysterious attitude which the western governments and principally the United States Government have taken toward the Hungarian struggle for liberation.

The basic facts and circumstances of this attitude, which amounts *in toto* to an outright betrayal by America of the Hungarian revolt, are analyzed in detail in the various speeches, leaflets, and articles presented. At this point, I only wish to comment on the ideological side of the official position, which has two separate aspects. On the one hand, there has been constructed an elaborate diversion from the question of strategic aid to Hungary, to wit: the question of humanitarian aid to Hungarian refugees. In this regard all the stops of the great American ballyhoo-organ have been pulled out, leading to a rash of rallies, fund collections, appeals, editorials, photographs, television appearances, presidential statements, to an outpouring of crocodile tears, etc., etc. Nixon flew to Austria, there to be photographed embracing a half dozen small refugee girls, the same innocent angels whom we have seen in the last decades handing floral bouquets to Hitler and to Stalin, and whose deceased sisters are presumably busy in Hell cutely curtsying to and receiving Christmas dolls from Satan himself. Diversion alone, however, is insufficient to stem the mounting disillusionment with Western policy, and the increasingly general realization that while Dulles gives haven to a few thousand refugees he not only gives nothing to the Hungarian struggle, but in fact gives decisive political support to the Stalinist butchers in their bloody work of suppression. Thus, the official policy finds it necessary to justify itself in terms of a more seriously argumentative propaganda, and comes up with—the danger of a third world war. This concept, first appearing in a few scattered and rather shamefaced editorials in such "responsible" journals as the *New York Times*, received official sanction from Dulles at the NATO foreign ministers' conference and now has become the general line of the press. A typical indication of this development in official propaganda is the article of *Times*' Paris correspondent Harold Callender in the *Sunday Times* of Dec. 23, which article is quite

evidently officially inspired. Under the headline "Europeans Weigh Threats to World Peace" Callender writes: "[. . . in the French parliamentary debate on Hungary] there was plenty of genuine indignation, yet in a sense the debate seemed almost frivolous because of the admixture of internal politics and because of the powerlessness of French orators to do anything for Hungary beyond eloquent expression of their feelings.

"This sense of powerlessness has characterized Western comments generally, and there developed also a belief that comments might be dangerous if they led Moscow to believe the West intended to do anything to encourage uprisings in the satellite states.

"The West was thus condemned to limit itself to what Secretary Dulles called moral pressure, which did not appear of great immediate efficacy against Soviet tanks and artillery. Mr. Dulles was among the first to point out the danger inherent in satellite unrest, even though it might be accompanied by opportunities for injecting some measure of freedom into the Soviet Empire, as seems to have taken place in Poland. . . . The principal fear is that this unrest might spread to East Germany, where the uprising would evoke sympathy, and possibly more than moral pressure, from West Germany. . . . Anyhow, there are plenty of Soviet tanks and troops to warn East Germans against imitating Hungary, and it is ironical that the West wishes this Soviet warning to succeed in the interests of European peace. For if there were a flare-up in East Germany and West German 'volunteers' became involved, Soviet troops might cross into West Germany, inadvertently or otherwise. . . . But unrest further east is considered dangerous for the West as well as for the Soviet Union in that it might create a panicky mood in the Kremlin, and that the Soviet leaders might believe their own propaganda that the West has stirred up satellite unrest.

"Some diplomats contend therefore that it is the state of mind of the Soviet leaders that matters most, and this state of mind can only be inferred by the West from the words and acts of the Soviet leaders. These diplomats insist the West must make it completely clear to Moscow that the free world will not seek to exploit satellite unrest. Mr. Dulles has given such assurances but doubt remains whether Moscow is fully convinced. . . ."

Thus according to Mr. Callender, we find:

(i) American policy is being formed on the basis of a Russian threat of war, and is based then on an overwhelming fear of Russia. But why, if this is really the case, does Mr. Dulles, departing from the inevitable diplomatic rationality which dictates the concealment of such a fear in the deepest recesses of top secret memoranda, proclaim it from the podium of a foreign ministers' conference, and in the political pages of the *New York Times*?

(ii) American policy is to apply "moral pressure" to the Russians. But what sort of moral pressure is it that finds its formulation as, "We deplore what you do, but fervently hope that it is successful"? The evident truth that emerges from the childish evasions of Dulles and Callender is that American policy is to apply moral pressure not against the Stalinists, but against the East European revolutionaries and on the side of the Stalinists. At the present moment, as a critical military phase of the continuing war between the Stalinist tyrants and the East European peoples draws near, both combatants naturally look for allies among all possible third parties, who for this reason can exert a significant and possibly decisive "moral pressure". This pressure, however,

must take the form of a declaration of willingness or of unwillingness to help one or another of the contending parties. Who is supported and encouraged in his attempts thinks of victory; who is abandoned and discouraged thinks of surrender. Such is the role of "moral pressure" in power politics. And for these reasons it is unmistakably plain that Dulles has repudiated the East European struggle for liberation, has done all that he could to discourage all its hopes and destroy all its projects, and has, behind his thin smoke screen of "moral pressure", placed the vast moral-political resources of the United States unreservedly on the side of the Stalinists.

(iii) Say Dulles and Callender: the weaker they grow, the more likely the Stalinist tyrants are to resort to war. But, the ludicrousness of this assertion can be demonstrated by an examination of the true social-strategic relationships in the present world context. Where in empirical reality have the Russians threatened war over Hungary? Their policy has been the very opposite of this: in their press they have constantly denied the significance of the Hungarian events, constantly pretended that the uprising never happened, or that anyhow it was over, or that anyhow it was nearly over, or that anyhow it was all the work of a tiny clique of Horthyite beasts whom Kadar was having a surprisingly hard time catching. Their diplomatic protests have been confined to the stalest of stale and the mildest of mild U.N. speeches about the imaginary "subversive activities" of the United States. What is evident in this is that they are compelled in view of the rapidly rising tide of revolutionary events in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself to avoid even the suggestion of a clash with the United States. The moment they begin attempting to mobilize their national economic, political, and social resources for a clash with the United States (and here we must realize that great nations in which the most varied political tendencies have begun to assert themselves are not led to suicide and annihilation between appetizer and dessert), they throw dynamite into the smoldering embers of Russian revolution; by beginning the attempt at war, they ensure that their power will not last to the point where they can wage it. The Russian leadership, torn by increasing dissension, quarreling more and more with its Chinese allies, based on a wide managerial class that is bound to form an ever more definite distaste for the costly imperial adventure in Eastern Europe, struggling with a rising tide of student and proletarian unrest in its very capital, is naturally in a mood to cut losses, as has been repeatedly evinced by its retreat from Austria, by its cancellation of two billion dollars in debts from its Polish and Roumanian colonies, and by all the humiliating details of its "over-generous" Polish settlement. Let us give them some good losses to cut! And what sort of war are they supposed to wage? An invasion of Austria and Western Germany? This surely cannot be carried out by an army that has to use five thousand tanks and fifteen divisions to subdue the civilian population of Budapest, by an army which already must cope with widespread desertion, by an army whose rear contains one hundred and fifty million people in revolt. How little fear of a European war really possesses the American policy makers is unmistakably revealed by the tolerant and even gleeful attitude they have taken toward the interruption of oil supplies to Western Europe; by the way that, for various reasons of imperial policy, they have withheld from Europe the supplies of oil on which the physical possibility of European military resistance, not to mention the physical possibility of supplying American armored divisions with gasoline, would necessarily be based.

These are the considerations that determined the line of rational policy which the American supporters of *Contemporary Issues* set for our nation and ourselves. While Dulles covertly established a common front with the Stalinist enslavers, we called for unconditional solidarity with the peoples of Eastern Europe. While the State Department conveyed assurances to the Kremlin lords, we demanded arms for the people of Hungary. While the NATO council expressed fear that revolt would spread to Poland and East Germany, we demanded assurances of military aid as the best guarantee that Russian guns would not be turned against the people of Warsaw and East Berlin as they were against the population of Budapest.

At the same time, we were not so foolish as to imagine that anything short of the widest popular protest could compel the Western governments to abandon their policy of betrayal. We set ourselves the task of undertaking the most extensive popular campaign consistent with our altogether too slender resources.

■

We issued in the United States, on November 3 and November 8, two leaflets, "We Cannot Let Russian Armor Crush the People of Hungary" and, "The Betrayal of Hungary", the first in twenty thousand and the second in thirty-five thousand copies; a corresponding leaflet was subsequently issued in London. These leaflets were distributed at various of the rallies and parades in support of Hungary that occupied world attention through November and early December. The first of these leaflets is reproduced below, together with a sampling of the extensive correspondence which came to us as a result of our own small participation in these great events. At a public meeting on November 11 we launched the "Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary" in order to draw together all the various currents of militant pro-Hungarian opinion. The Committee held a second public meeting on November 24, at which Mr. Keller of *Contemporary Issues* delivered the speech reproduced below.

Needless to relate, our efforts to force the American government to supply the people of Hungary with the only aid that could help them win was unsuccessful, and the only weapons the freedom fighters received were those presented to them by Russian and Hungarian soldiers. After three months of slaughter and terror, the Hungarian revolt has for the present been crushed, armed resistance almost entirely wiped out, the revolutionary councils dissolved, the flower of the Hungarian youth, intellectuals and working class executed or imprisoned. It was not a revolt easily destroyed. "Crushed" a dozen times in the proclamations of both its open enemies and its avowed "friends", it flared forth again as many times, subsiding only when it became completely apparent that not the tiniest shred of help could be expected. The refusal to so much as apply economic sanctions or even withdraw recognition from the Kadar government was a clear signal to the Russians: "You may do whatever you please with the people of Hungary; never fear anything from us". With the last restraints removed, the Kremlin proceeded to impose unvarnished Stalinism on the Hungarian population.

There can be no turning back the clock, however, for Hungary, after the October days, can never be the same. The universal solidarity of the Hungarian people, forged in two months of struggle, remains unbroken in spite of all and continues to play a decisive role in the determination of events. It is this universal solidarity that has forced the Stalinists to juggle Hungary like a

hot potato from hand to hand, rotating its troops to prevent a too extensive contact with the uprising from contaminating their regiments. It is this universal solidarity that has prevented the Kremlin from finding a decisive solution to the crisis and that has kept the Hungarian question on the agenda of history as "unfinished business". A dangerous infection is collecting around the Hungarian thorn, and the bear begins to limp.

The material presented here is intended to serve as an interim indication of the various currents of opinion beginning to flow in the new world situation brought about by the Hungarian events. We intend to continue our active participation in events as they develop, and invite our readers to play the greatest role possible for them, either independently along the lines which flow from the material which we have presented here, or in direct cooperation with the editors and friends of *Contemporary Issues* and *Dinge der Zeit* who can be reached at their New York, Boston, London, or German addresses.

A LEAFLET

The active intervention of the American friends of Contemporary Issues in the campaign for support to Hungary began with the distribution of the following leaflet at a parade in New York City, on Sunday, November 4th.

MISKOLC, Hungary, Nov. 1 — Another instance of Hungarian defiance occurred two days ago in Nyiregyhaza, 75 miles east of Miskolc. As reported by Miskolc officials, women lay down in the roadway to halt the movement of Soviet tanks. Two women were crushed to death.

(*The New York Times*, Nov. 2)

WE CANNOT LET RUSSIAN ARMOR CRUSH THE PEOPLE OF HUNGARY!

The Hungarian people have recaptured their freedom through a storm of blood. Although the Russian tyrants and their Hungarian proconsuls invoked the force of iron and fire, although the powers of the West abetted the Russian butchery by their shameful inaction, the bravery and miraculous determination of the Hungarians compelled their foreign rulers to yield before the hurricane of national revolution. The overturn in Hungary has brought the whole of Russia's East European empire to the boiling point. Poland, which furnished the spark for the Hungarian revolution, has been seething ever since, with the fate of the Gomulka government in question from one day to the next. From Rumania come reports of student riots and demonstrations, of emergency troop movements, of frantic government attempts to pacify the aroused Hungarian minority in Transylvania. In East Germany there are student demonstrations, slowdown strikes, nervous warnings, and military manifestations on the part of a frightened government. Czechoslovakia begins to stir; there are demonstrations of solidarity with the Hungarians.

All these events are reverberations of the stupendous explosion in Hungary, which has torn a wound in the flesh of Russia's totalitarian empire. From this

center of infection the virus of national independence is spreading throughout the entire organism of Russian rule. None know this better than the directors of the totalitarian system themselves. The Russian imperialists stand to lose more than Hungary; they face the loss of all. Ominous signs indicate that the Kremlin rulers, desperate at the danger, have decided to gamble their future on a bloody attempt to crush the Hungarian rebels with the full force of their military machine. By the time these lines appear in print, Russian mechanized divisions and jet bombers may once again be pouring death and destruction on a people whose heroism is hardly paralleled in history.

Can we permit the people of Hungary to expire? Can we force them to fight tanks with pistols and armored cars with pitchforks? All through the bitter torment of the past two weeks the Hungarians begged for help from the West and received empty praise. They pleaded for arms and were sent editorials. Reporters in Budapest told of crowds surrounding their cars, asking, "Why wasn't there even a Security Council resolution condemning the Soviet Union that the Russians could veto? Not even that! Why won't you give us guns, even one pistol!" In the words of Cardinal Mindszenty, "Hungary has so far received only bad treatment from the world, especially from the big powers. The thing which no one in the world—not even the big powers—dared to do, was done by small, forlorn Hungary . . . We ask the West—and especially the big powers—to support us politically and also to aid us materially in this grave situation."

For nearly a decade, Western diplomats—and especially State Department officials—vied with each other in promises to support the liberation of Eastern Europe. Tens of millions of dollars were consumed in radio broadcasts, in propaganda-laden balloons and in other escapades to assure the Eastern European peoples that "they are not alone", that any popular effort against their Russian overlords would be met with unstinting aid from the West. And now that the long-silent but gathering forces of popular resistance have finally exploded in a sweeping revolution for national freedom, what have the Western powers to offer? The Hungarians rise against the apparently overwhelming power of the Russians and their Quislings: The Western capitals issue polite applause. To the amazement of the entire world, the uprising lasts into a second day, spreads, enters a third: The Western capitals express admiration. The Hungarian Army joins the revolution, the government eggs on Russian troops to murder its own people: The Western powers express indignation. The Nagy government begins to sink in the revolutionary sea and offers concession after concession to the rebels: The Western capitals suggest that a quieter, more modest, Gomulka-type development might have been better. Thousands die with guns in hand: The Western powers convene the United Nations Security Council—and adjourn without so much as a resolution of censure. The Stalinist power melts in the white heat of revolution, cities fall to the rebels, the Russians leave Budapest, the revolt appears victorious without a single bullet from outside: The Eisenhower administration claims credit for it all!

This miserable inaction does not cease even now, when Russia pours in reinforcements, rings Budapest with its tanks, occupies airfields, shuts the Austrian border and prepares to cow the revolution or crush it entirely. The Western powers react by reconvening the Security Council to consider the appointment of an investigating committee. And President Eisenhower chooses the moment to announce that the Hungarians are welcome to . . . food!

Each successful step that the Russians are able to take toward crushing the Hungarian revolution buttresses their power in the rest of Eastern Europe. But if the Hungarian revolt lasts a few more days, a week, perhaps a month, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, all rising rapidly to the kindling point, may be in flames. The hybrid regime of Gomulka, the Polish Nagy, can be overthrown if the Poles take heart from the Hungarian example. However, if the Russians are allowed to subjugate Hungary, the revolutionary movements in all these countries will be killed in embryo. The Russians will be able to terrorize Rumania and Czechoslovakia in the old Stalinist manner. East Germany, where more than 300,000 Russian troops are camped, will be forced to submit. And Krushchev will be free to deal with resurgent Polish nationalism unencumbered by other military considerations. The Russian Army will once more stand squarely across the road of East European liberation. Future gains for the people of these oppressed lands will have to be purchased with suffering more horrible than that in Hungary. If the governments of the West leave Hungary to its fate, they will share the responsibility for these monstrous consequences.

The irresistible surge of national feeling in Hungary has forced even the Nagy regime, left with no foundation, to give voice to popular sentiment. Nagy has denounced the Warsaw pact, demanded the evacuation of Russian troops and called for assistance from the West. The Russians no longer have even the fig leaf of a government "invitation" or a military treaty to cover the naked brutality of their intervention. The road is clear for assistance to the besieged but audacious Hungarian people.

History hangs in the balance during the few days ahead. We must not leave the Hungarians to face the crisis alone. Worldwide economic sanctions must be imposed against Russia. **ABOVE ALL, WE MUST SUPPLY THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE WITH THE ARMS FOR WHICH THEY HAVE BEGGED, THE ARMS WHICH ALONE CAN ENABLE THEM TO DEFEND THEIR OWN HUMANITY AND THAT OF ALL MANKIND.** Guns, tanks, artillery should be poured across every available border and dropped from the skies. If the Western governments refuse this step, if they will not put rifles into the hands of the heroes who offer their bodies to the steel treads of Russian tanks, let them cease to pretend that the armaments they have piled high are for the cause of freedom and justice. These arms in the hands of East European rebels can bring the Russian empire down and end all fear of an early catastrophic war.

Now is the time to act. Tomorrow may bring the headline, "Hungarian Rebels Crushed by Red Army". Telegraph the President, the State Department, members of Congress and demand the immediate shipment of arms to Hungary. Ask the organizations to which you belong to do likewise. There is still time to avert tragedy!

November 3, 1956

AN ADDRESS BY ROBERT KELLER

Mr. Robert Keller delivered a speech at each of two successive public meetings of the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary. The second of these speeches given on November 24, 1956 follows:

ARMS TO HUNGARY!

Nearly two weeks have passed since I addressed the first public meeting of the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary. Many of you who are here

today will remember what I had to say at that time. I openly accused our government in Washington of treacherously reneging on its lavish promises of aid and liberation to the captive nations of Eastern Europe. I denounced the United Nations, and especially Mr. Lodge, for monstrous delays and procrastination in the face of Russian acts of barbarism against Hungary equal only to the blackest days of the Second World War. I declared that the Hungarian people did not want cheap sympathy; they wanted and still want arms. At a time when only the faintest whispers were reaching the United States of freight cars in Budapest to carry Hungarian youth eastward, I warned the public that the Russians were preparing to deport countless numbers of Hungarians to Siberia. I tried to show that only two courses of action are open to the Freedom Fighters: If the Hungarian patriots are suppressed, the Russians will simply annihilate Hungary as a nation; but if the freedom struggle is supported with arms from the West, the Hungarian people will carry the brilliant flame of liberation not only through the captive nations of Eastern Europe, but into the unstable, wavering ranks of the Russian Army itself, and finally into the very heart of the Russian Slave Empire, reducing to ashes the cold war that has cast its grotesque shadow over humanity for the past ten years.

On that dismal Sunday, two weeks ago, the news from Hungary was black indeed. Budapest was being reduced to ruins after six days of steady bombardment from Russian tanks, artillery and planes. All the cities and towns of that valiant country were falling one by one into Russian hands—or so the newspapers told us—despite a wave of popular resistance unmatched in the history of human courage. At a time when this Emergency Committee refused to acknowledge that the Hungarian people had surrendered, virtually all the leading newspapers, periodicals and radio commentators described the struggle as over. The *New York Times*, of November 11th, speaking virtually for all the newspapers in the country, summarized the press reports from Hungary under the headline: "Hungary Crushed". The *Times* writer, describing the situation in Budapest, observed: "Except for the clanking of Soviet tanks and the shriek of Soviet jets flying guard overhead, the city is quiet". On that terrible Sunday, the press in effect was no longer printing reports; it was writing obituaries. In the embassies, chancelleries and state departments of the West, they were arranging the decor of the flowers to be placed on the grave of Hungarian freedom. And again: While the Emergency Committee called for a picket line before the White House to demand arms for the Hungarian patriots, boycotts against Russia throughout the entire world, an American declaration of asylum to all Russian soldiers who refuse to shoot down the Freedom Fighters, and official warnings to the Kremlin butchers that they face merciless justice for genocide and crimes against humanity,—while all these appeals and demands were going out from the rostrum of our meeting, the diplomats-in-exile and the leading organizations of the Hungarian community in the United States were picketing an empty U.N. building and—of course—the inevitable Russian Embassy, which scarcely had to be told that it is the enemy not only of Hungarian, but of human, freedom.

And then, as evening crept over that Sunday, two weeks ago, the news began to come in—report after report—that Budapest was not quiet, that Hungary was not crushed! My friends, to have only seen the faces of the morticians in the State Department when it was reported that on Csepel Island, in the industrial suburbs of Budapest itself, thousands of workmen were barricaded in their factories with arms in hand, fighting back wave after wave

of Russian attacks! To have only seen those cynical faces when late dispatches indicated that in the coal regions of Hungary, miners were still carrying on a defiant armed struggle against the overwhelming military forces of Russian imperialism! In the days that quickly followed each other over those two weeks, the most astonishing reports of Hungarian courage and tenacity began to gain ground over the dismal reports of defeat. On the 14th of November, already three days after the press had so majestically announced that Hungary was "crushed", manifestoes again appeared on the streets of Budapest demanding free elections and the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary. On the 15th of November, four days after the press had declared that Hungary was "crushed", ten thousand workmen collected in the streets of Budapest and marched upon the Parliament buildings of the city—not as they had weeks earlier, when the principal barrier to an uprising consisted of a few police detachments, but under the guns of hundreds of Russian tanks and tens of thousands of Russian troops—to demand that the deportation of their countrymen cease at once. By the 18th of November, a full week after the press announced that Hungary was "crushed", delegations of miners and oil workers from all parts of the nation appeared before the detestable Kadar regime, not hat in hand like bureaucrats-in-exile before the United Nations, but with an ultimatum on their lips that the mines would be flooded and the oil wells blown up if Russian troops did not leave Hungary in three weeks. These men were not risking cushy jobs as journalists and radio broadcasters; they were risking their lives!

During those extraordinary days, while the Hungarian people were rising to the highest summits of heroism, the United Nations was dredging the lowest depths of treachery and hypocrisy. We know that during this crucial period of Hungarian and world history, the U.N. chorus of babblers did nothing but inquire into Russian preparations for repression—preparations about which every porter in the U.N. was thoroughly informed days in advance, not to mention the delegates themselves. Having made the "record", the Security Council voted on Mr. Lodge's miserable resolution, went through the motions of a Russian veto (which itself was clearly expected), and then retreated to the "moral weight" of a General Assembly resolution against Russian intervention. I must pause here to say something about all this "morality". The "high" moral caliber of the Assembly, not to speak of its resolutions, was completely exploded by the fact that this self-same Assembly, which denounced Russian intervention with such high-blown words on one day, seated the Kadar regime delegates the next day. These Kadar gangsters, whose hands were still wet with the blood of the Hungarian people, were thus permitted to speak in the name of the Hungarian nation.

But the most disgusting buffoonery of all was enacted around the Cuban genocide resolution last week. On November 15th, the Cuban delegate dared to declare openly what the other delegates had only mumbled in their cock-tails—namely, that by deporting tens of thousands of Hungarians, the Russians were committing genocide. Let no one here believe that this resolution was dangerous in itself; there was nothing in the resolution to suggest how it could be implemented. But at least it was dramatic. If the U.N. could do no more than talk, let it at least use strong words—that is, words that reflected the real situation. The *New York Times* of November 17th reported that the American delegation "welcomes Cuba's initiative". By the next day, however, something had happened to adulterate Cuba's "initiative". Where the first version of the resolution directly charged that the deportation of Hungarians to Russia

constituted genocide, the revised version presented on the 18th simply cited the Genocide Convention as such and described the destination of the deportees to "places outside Hungary". What had brought this astonishing change about? The *Times* reporter vaguely indicated that the adulteration of the Cuban resolution by the Cuban delegate had been made "with the aim of getting wider support . . .". In the afternoon of the same day, however, the *New York Post* leaked the real story. "Backers of the (Genocide) Convention said two U.S. delegates, Ambassador Lodge and Senator Knowland, had fought to keep the genocide charge out of the Cuban resolution. This was said to be in deference to U.S. Senate views against human rights treaties."

The *Post* reporter continued: "These sources said it was pressure from Lodge and Knowland that also led Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru to drop a genocide charge from their resolution—adopted November 9th—which called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and free elections there under U.N. auspices." The lame excuse that the resolutions were adulterated to oblige the United States Senate will hardly bear water. Messrs. Lodge and Knowland might easily have abstained from voting with an explanation of their reasons, thus supplying these resolutions with something more than cheap double-talk and tiresome platitudes.

If Dimitri Shepilov has consistently stirred public anger by playing the trumpet in the orchestra of the U.N., Mr. Lodge has consistently allayed public fears by playing the first violin. Two weeks ago, I described in some detail how Lodge scandalously deferred U.N. consideration of the troop withdrawal resolution when the Russians began to ring Budapest with tanks. At that time, there was little to support my description beyond an article in the *New York Post*. The substance of this description has since been confirmed in the *New York Times* of November 14th. "According to reliable sources," notes the *Times* report, "the United States dissuaded Britain and France from introducing a resolution on Friday, Nov. 2, calling on Russia to halt its intervention in Hungary. On the whole," continues the report—and I quote, "some Western diplomats here feel the Council should have had a chance to act sooner and to take a strong stand promptly in the hope that this might have deterred the Soviet onslaught. . . . It is also reported that the United States wanted to prevent the British and French pressure for action on Hungary from obscuring the crisis in the Middle East. Washington is said to have regarded the action of British, French and Israeli forces in Egypt as potentially more dangerous to world peace."

This cynical relegation of Hungary's mortal struggle for liberation to the status of a third-rate affair in the history of our times must be characterized as one of the most outrageous distortions ever perpetrated before world public opinion. While the crude maneuvers of the world powers in Suez have steadily retrogressed into a miserable squabble over pipeliness and a ditch, the Hungarian patriots for nearly six defiant weeks have been shaking the Russian slave empire, and with it all the forces of modern totalitarianism, to their very foundations. If our officials falsely claim that the Suez crisis presents the greatest danger of world war, we can truthfully assert here, today, that the Hungarian struggle presents the greatest hope for world peace. With every day that this struggle continues, the people of Eastern Europe slowly gather their forces against their Kremlin rulers. With every day that this struggle continues, demoralization reaches into the very heart of the Russian regime, widening all the divisions among the slave masters themselves. And above all,

with every day that the struggle continues, restlessness and demoralization seep into all ranks of the Russian army.

Already during the early weeks of the uprising, reports reached the United States of fairly widespread defections from the Kremlin's occupation troops. In those days we learned of fraternization between Budapest students and Russian tankers, of friendly Soviet troops in another community who voluntarily withdrew to nearby forests and received food from the local patriot forces and population, and generally that the Russian soldiers were bitterly dissatisfied with fighting against the sparsely-armed population of the country. Since then the evidence has achieved panoramic proportions. We now know that virtually all the Russian troops who occupied Hungary before the uprising have been withdrawn because of their widespread sympathy for the patriot forces. According to a dispatch by John MacCormac in the *New York Times* of November 17th, six fugitives from an area near the Russian border report that, "a new concentration camp has been set up and contains 5,000 to 6,000 disarmed Soviet soldiers. They are said to be under heavy guard. One transport is reported to have already been moved out of the camp eastward." Mr. MacCormac's report further notes that "Other refugees have reported that 200 to 300 Russian deserters are fighting on the side of about 8,000 Hungarian guerrillas", who hold a large oblong area in northwestern Hungary. This extraordinary report continues: "All refugees who had participated in the fighting are convinced that the Soviet garrison in Hungary had been replaced for the final attack (at dawn, November 4th) by reinforcements who were largely Kirghiz or Mongols. The garrison soldiers had been mostly Russians.

"One very circumstantial report from the Hungarian-Soviet frontier station of Zahony is that the Russians built four pontoon bridges over the River Tisza near there. Three were for Soviet troops entering Hungary and one for those who were sent back, either because they had suffered in the long fighting or because they had not given good accounts of themselves.

"The Mongol troops who were brought to Hungary for the reconquest seemed utterly confused," concludes Mr. MacCormac. "Many of them inquired how far they were from Germany . . ." and according to other reports, confused the Danube River with the Suez Canal.

Finally, large numbers of Russian soldiers have crossed the Yugoslav frontier, surrendering their weapons to border guards and seeking internment. "Nearly all the Soviet troops seem short of food," declares Mr. MacCormac. In fact, according to a more recent account, Russian soldiers have even crossed into Austria looking for food, while in one case we are informed that a Soviet crew sold its tank to Hungarian patriot forces for a loaf of bread. Do these reports seem incredible? Then to this I must answer that Russian logistics are in a state of complete anarchy, with troops foraging for food side by side with Hungarians in the ruins of cities and towns. Despite all its tanks and planes, the Russian army, which Mr. Lodge regards as such a formidable threat in Suez, is not and has never been a modern army. It is an undisciplined, restless, demoralized horde, which detests its own commanders and rulers far more than the civilian populations against which it has been forced to turn its guns.

Two weeks ago, it was only possible to speak of defections in the Russian army. Today, it is possible to assert that the spirit of liberation has already begun to burn in the ostensibly secure and well-policed domain of the Kremlin itself. Perhaps the most heart-warming news to appear from Russia in decades is Molotov's expressed fear that the students of Moscow University are taking inspiration from the behavior of the students of Budapest University. This

extraordinary admission that Budapest has infected Moscow is elaborated by admissions that Russian students are restless, that the doctrines of the slave-masters are being questioned, that inquiry and criticism are sweeping an entire generation of youth who were reared on nothing but the Byzantine crudities of Stalin and the slightly diluted vulgarities of Krushchev. The dessication of the totalitarian regime is reducing all of Russia to tinder, on which the Hungarian struggle for freedom is scattering its bright sparks of revolt. The Hungarian people have not only thrown the fate of their nation into the scales; they have thrown the entire cold war itself into the scales. For the American people, this means that without exploding a single nuclear bomb or without so much as firing a single shot, that vile, rotten structure that has cast its shadow over the post-war era of the past ten years can be buried forever among the cadavers of tyranny. It is this possibility, a possibility that reduces the Suez Crisis to a mere mud pie before the billows of history, that our officials in all their majesty have decided to characterize as second-rate.

The astonishing general strike in Hungary, now going into its sixth week, is not only testimony to the superlative courage of this magnificent nation; it is also evidence of the fact that the Hungarian struggle for freedom has passed the point of no return. On November 11th, two weeks ago, I warned that the Hungarian struggle can never end in a compromise. Either the Hungarian people will liberate themselves, and with the liberation of their own nation free all of Eastern Europe, or their nation will be utterly destroyed. It is these two drastic alternatives that rendered it possible to estimate the extraordinary endurance of the struggle. It is these two alternatives that explain the capacity of the Hungarian people to absorb one of the most destructive blows ever visited upon a small nation—and yet, from the ruins of its cities, from the carnage and the slaughter, from the deportations of tens of thousands of its youth, to rise up again and still with the vigor that marked the inception of its struggle nearly six weeks ago. It is the realization of these two alternatives—either total victory over the Russians or the horror of total annihilation—that has impelled this Emergency Committee to demand the immediate shipment of arms to the Hungarian people. The general strike is progressively demoralizing the Russian invader. But this general strike has meaning only if it throws the *physical* advantage in the present struggle to the side of the patriots. The Hungarian people are not exchanging diplomatic niceties with Mr. Hammerskjöld; they are exchanging mortal blows with Mr. Krushchev, the value of whose promises has been completely exposed, only today, by the shameful abduction of Imre Nagy under a safe conduct pass from the puppet Kadar regime. In short, the axis of the general strike is the widespread guerrilla warfare in the countryside, which threatens every day to explode once again in the cities. It is this warfare, that admittedly has never been subdued, that springs back to life as soon as a Russian patrol passes by, or moves threateningly on the horizon beyond the range of Russian guns—it is this warfare that has paralyzed the Russian cohorts in Hungary today.

Arms to the Hungarian patriots is the only final road to Hungarian freedom. It is the dividing line that separates the real defenders of Hungarian freedom from sanctimonious “well-wishers” and outright hypocrites. This is not our view alone; it is the burning demand of the revolutionary leaders themselves. In one of the most penetrating and incisive articles to appear on the freedom struggle thus far, Mr. MacCormac finally declared last Sunday what we, here, had insisted for weeks—namely, that the Russian leaders can never make peace with Hungary, that their strategy can only be to sacrifice Hungary as a horrible

example to all the captive peoples in their empire. He too, warns the American public, as this Committee warned the public before and warns it again today:

"The Kadar Government will promise everything which gives the appearance of liberty without its substance or any guarantee that it will endure.

"While this is happening, the Government will reconstitute under some other name the A.V.O. or secret police. It will carry out a drastic purge of the Army, which in the revolution against the Communists and the war against the Russians showed itself to be unreliable where it was not actually hostile. It will see that every known or potential revolutionary leader is executed, jailed or transported." This description, Mr. MacCormac states,—and I quote again, "... expresses the unanimous opinion of the revolutionary leaders with whom I (Mr. MacCormac) talked both in Hungary and here in Vienna. They were so certain that this must be their country's fate that each saw hope of anything better only in a renewal of the armed conflict, but this time with Western help.

"'Give us 3,000 bazookas', they cried, 'and we can destroy 3,000 tanks and after that other thousands as fast as they come. It will cost us our lives but it will cost the Russians more. It is the only thing that can save Hungary, and in the long run save you' . . .

"Unfortunately," concludes Mr. MacCormac in this courageous article, "both Moscow and Hungary have made another discovery, which is that the West will not support with anything stronger than words the efforts of Moscow's satellites to throw off their slavery."

We do not propose to permit the West to get away with this crime! We do not propose to permit the West to conceal its treachery to Hungary with vulgar, gaudy, Hollywood productions in Camp Kilmer based on the misery of a handful of refugees! We do not propose to answer the needs of 9 million valiant Hungarians with green candles on Thanksgiving Day, as Bela Fabian seems to suggest, or to preside with Monsignor Varga over flag ceremonies to the Hungarian dead. We cry out for the living, not only for the heroic dead! We demand arms for Hungary—not candles!

We demand world-wide economic sanctions against Russia—not watered-down U.N. resolutions!

We demand that the Russian slave-masters be branded as criminals against humanity subject to the merciless justice of popular tribunals—not vague references to the Genocide Convention!

We demand an immediate declaration that deserters from the Russian army be given unqualified asylum and protection—not hypocritical ceremonies in Camp Kilmer that are designed to conceal our government's miserable inaction!

But above all, we demand those 3,000 bazookas, guns, ammunition and tanks to free Hungary and the entire world from the Byzantine totalitarianism that has plagued mankind for all these decades of contemporary history.

Jager House
New York City
November 24, 1956

RESOLUTIONS OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ARMS TO HUNGARY

The following five resolutions were formulated to make definite the policy of the American Friends of Contemporary Issues and of the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary on the Hungarian events. They were passed unanimously at each of two public meetings held by the Emergency Committee.

For eight days the massed might of the Russian army has been slaughtering men, women and children in the streets of Budapest and other Hungarian towns. For eight days Russian tanks, planes and heavy artillery have been engaged in unequal combat by Hungarian patriots whose only desire is the freedom of their nation. The Kremlin leaders have made it manifest that they are prepared to lay waste all of Hungary and decimate its population rather than surrender a portion of their power and privilege. Instant death or exile to the frozen tundras of Siberia are the evident fate of Hungary's courageous freedom fighters when their last bullets are exhausted.

In view of the Hungarian people's terrible plight and the even more horrible perspective confronting them, we call upon the United States government to undertake without delay the following steps:

1. Immediate delivery of arms of all types to the embattled Hungarian population by every possible means. This is the only way to prevent their wholesale extermination. If Russia can send arms to Egypt, the United States can send them to Hungary.
2. A prompt and unequivocal declaration of readiness to give similar military aid to the people of Poland, East Germany, Austria and other nations of Eastern Europe should Russian guns be turned against them.
3. Severance of all economic relations with Russia and initiation of a world-wide economic boycott of that country as long as it suppresses the struggle for freedom of Hungary or any other East European nation.
4. The offer of refuge and economic assistance to all Russian soldiers who refuse to shoot down Hungarian patriots. This offer to be spread by millions of leaflets dropped over Hungary in all the languages of the Russian empire.
5. The branding of Russian leaders as criminals guilty of genocide for mass execution and prospective deportation of huge portions of the Hungarian population, accompanied by the warning that they face trial by popular tribunals for these crimes the day their power crumbles.

We call upon the press, radio and all other media of communication to broadcast this resolution as extensively as possible so that the Hungarian people, appealing desperately for help, will know that there are those who are not prepared to let that call go unanswered.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The above resolutions of the Emergency Committee were transmitted telegraphically on November 11th to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and various other leading government officials. In return, the Committee was favored to receive the following typed form letter, which Mr. Meagher of the

State Department sent out in the period in question to all of the hundreds of citizens who wrote to the Department of State protesting the government's inaction:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

November 30, 1956

Gentlemen,

After consideration at the White House, your recent communication to the President, expressing your concern for the Hungarian people, has been sent to this Department, so that we might also see your views. We appreciate very much the spirit which prompted your message and have brought your views to the attention of interested officers of the Department.

As of possible interest, I have enclosed material describing some of the action taken by this country and the free world to assist the Hungarian people.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

Sgd. John P. Meagher,

Chief,

Public Services Division

The enclosures to which Mr. Meagher refers consisted of a number of quite trivial press releases and of reprints of the public speeches of a number of American officials. In return, the following letter was sent by a representative of the Emergency Committee:

THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

FOR ARMS TO HUNGARY

P.O. Box 113,
Village Station,
150 Christopher St.
New York 14, N. Y.

December 11, 1956

Mr. John P. Meagher, Chief,
Public Services Division,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Meagher,

On behalf of the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary, I take this opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 30th as well as the several documents contained therein, all having arrived safely and in good condition. I fear, however, that the Department's time and effort, so valuable in this perilous period of national revolutions, has been expended to no account. It was unnecessary to burden your staff with the collection of material which has been displayed so conspicuously in the press, radio and television and on which the members of this committee, being literate, as well as close followers of the Hungarian events, have been thoroughly informed. Furthermore, you will recall that our telegram had not so much inquired as to what action the government *had* taken, but had urged that the government supply the Hungarian people with arms, institute an economic boycott of

Russia and offer asylum to Russian army deserters, a form of action which the government had not taken then, more than a month ago, and still sedulously avoids to this very day. There is also not the slightest reference to these demands in your letter.

Since you, sir, have become the interlocutor between the President, certain interested officers in the Department of State and this committee, may we prevail upon you to convey the following to these gentlemen: We regard the "action" taken by our government as an abominable caricature and deliberate subversion of those simple steps which alone could have turned the tide in Hungary. Do not think for one moment that this Committee has been deceived by Mr. Lodge's pious utterances at the United Nations and the tepid, toothless resolutions he has sponsored there. It is certainly past surmise that the astute planners of American policy were more acutely aware, if not more painfully aware than the world at large, that the Russian power in Hungary lay prostrate for weeks on end, that the Russian army was riddled with disaffection, that the Hungarian army had gone over to the side of the revolution, that whole areas were in the hands of the rebels, and that all that was needed to administer the *coup de grace* to Russian rule in Hungary were several thousand bazookas or their equivalent. It is a tribute to the incredible tenacity and indomitable spirit of the Hungarian people that this remains a distinct possibility even today. Why, then, gentlemen, have you with equally incredible tenacity refused and continue to refuse the simple demand for arms which was the desperate and persistent cry of the freedom fighters and which alone can determine the outcome of the struggle still being waged in Hungary?

Do not think that this Committee and the millions who have been stunned by the government's shameful inaction will be deceived by the tepid resolutions it has sponsored in the United Nations, the pageantry at Camp Kilmer and the great philanthropic gestures it has made in getting food and medicine into Hungary, only to be dispensed by the Kadar regime. The Hungarian people do not want charity, nor do they wish to settle *en masse* in the United States, nor do they need watered down UN resolutions. These "actions" do nothing to help those still fighting in Hungary. On the contrary, they are simply a pseudo-humanitarian cloak to hide the nakedness of your *inaction*, gentlemen. There is only one reason why there is any food and refugee problem at all: the Russians are still in Hungary. There is only one reason why the Russians are still in Hungary: the United States has not supplied the rebels with arms. And there is only one reason why the United States has not supplied the rebels with arms, and that is that certain interested officials in the State Department and the White House, who are the makers of American policy, have for some doubtless very profound reasons decided against it.

Far more significant to us than all the moral posturing, handouts and back-slapping which conceals the government's inaction on behalf of the Hungarians is the government's real action on behalf of the Russians. The refusal to act is in itself a form of action. So, for example, interested officials of the State Department and our United Nations delegation knew in advance of the impending November 4th repression and did not announce it to the world, did not forewarn the Hungarians even through secret diplomacy. This is incredible! The United States government, after all its indignant mewling at the UN, still continues to do business of all kinds with the Russian beast and the representatives of the detested Kadar regime! Which side are you on, gentlemen? Are you for the liberation of Hungary and the other satellite countries, or would you rather see Stalinist "law and order" prevail in Eastern Europe?

The Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary demands an explanation for the wretched behavior of the United States government with respect to the Hungarian people of whom tens of thousands have perished for the very ideals this government claim to represent. The American people, whose interests in foreign affairs the State Department is supposed to represent, have a right to know why it is that the Hungarian revolution was abandoned at the outset and left to its own meager resources.

We await a prompt and complete reply to this letter, which, together with your reply, we shall make public at the first opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

J. Grossman

For the Emergency Committee

As of January 15, 1957, no reply from the Department of State has been forthcoming. Yet another repercussion arising from the Emergency Committee's telegrams of November 11th, was the following correspondence between the Emergency Committee, Representative John McCormack, and the Department of State. We present it as a practical instance of the current working relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the American State power, and ask the attentive reader to observe the "deference" and "sincerity" with which a relatively minor bureaucrat addresses the man who, as majority leader of the House of Representatives, bears the constitutional majesty of that governmental body which in the text of the American Constitution is more than any other defined as central.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 19, 1956

Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary
New York, New York

Gentlemen,

I received your telegram of November 12th and I sent it to the Secretary of State. I enclose the reply I received from Assistant Secretary Hill, which I am forwarding to you for your information and for your files.

I also enclose copy of a speech which I delivered on November 26th. You will note that I made some very pointed remarks in relation to Hungary, as well as recommendations as to the action which should be taken, both by the United States and by the United Nations. I received a tremendous amount of favorable comments from persons throughout the country, particularly in relation to Hungary.

With the Season's Greetings, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Sgd. John McCormack

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1956

Dear Mr. McCormack,

I have received your letter of November 19 transmitting a telegram from the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary in which that Committee recommends that the United States send arms to the Hungarian people.

It has been the position of the United States Government that the Hungarian situation can best be dealt with through the United Nations. It is our hope that through the joint efforts of freedom loving nations working within and through that organization a solution will be found which will assure that the Hungarian people achieve their aims of greater liberty, national independence and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The provision of arms by the United States, if such were indeed feasible, to the Hungarian insurgents who are faced with the overwhelming might of the Soviet army would not, it is felt, contribute to such a solution. As President Eisenhower remarked in his news conference on November 14th, "The United States doesn't now, and never has, advocated open rebellion by an undefended populace against force over which they could not possibly prevail."

I am forwarding the telegram of the Emergency Committee, herewith. Thank you for bringing its views to the Department's attention.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Sgd. Robert C. Hill,
Assistant Secretary

The "pointed remarks" on Hungary to which Representative McCormack refers in his letter are as follows:

Delivered in the Jewish House of Worship, Temple B'nai Mosha, Boston, Massachusetts, November 26, 1956:

"... In the case of Israel, that little country is confronted with the problem and duty of preserving and retaining liberty and independence. In the case of Hungary, of regaining liberty and independence. But the basic objective of both countries is liberty and independence.

"In Hungary we witness Communist Russia sending in its forces of killers to suppress the fight for liberty. The reason why they moved into Hungary is because the uprising was against any or all forms of Communist government. We witness the Soviet Union establishing the Kadar regime, which is not a legitimate government.

"We have heard the pleas of the fighting and dying Hungarians falling on ears of inaction. Action that the United States and the United Nations could have taken and failed to take has played into the Kremlin's hands in Hungary and elsewhere.

"For we know that there are millions of persons behind the Iron Curtain who hate all forms of Communistic government; and that they are watching events in Hungary. Like the people of Hungary, they want their own free government. When they see inaction in the case of Hungary, it deters their determination and action for any similar uprising.

"Now, what can we do?

"In addition to the sending of medicines and food, which has been done to

some extent, the United States could announce its refusal to recognize the Soviet puppet government of Hungary,—at least until all Soviet troops are withdrawn, and these Hungarians forcibly deported to Siberia are returned to their homes.

“The United Nations has finally adopted over Soviet opposition a resolution to send United Nations observers to Hungary. The present non-legitimate regime in Hungary has announced its refusal to permit their entry.

“An announcement that the United Nations observers were going into Hungary could be made and the attempt made. Or, better still, if the United Nations observers were to fly to the Budapest airport in a United Nations marked plane, the Soviet Union could only do one of two things—admit them and thus weaken their position, or arrest and expel them, which would also weaken their position. The burden then would be upon the Soviet Union and the present non-legitimate regime in Hungary to forcibly deny their admission. This action would show to the world what the Soviets are, and open the way to genuine diplomatic and economic action. This action would also convey a message of action and real hope to the Patriots in Hungary. It would be a stimulating action to millions of others behind the iron curtain who are longing for freedom from any kind of Communist domination.

“The forcible denial of the entry of the United Nations observers into Hungary would arouse world public opinion that the Soviet Union and the present Hungarian regime could not withstand.

“We will remember that not so long ago they had to bend to world public opinion where Red Cross trucks with food and medicines were denied admission. As a result of that world public opinion was aroused, and within 24 hours they permitted them to enter Hungary to bring relief to the suffering people.

“And I might say, that over two weeks ago, I suggested to a high official of our State Department that such action be taken, as well as sending over the United Nations observers and compelling the Communists to refuse their admission. I also suggested that our country announce that it would not recognize the present Soviet Puppet regime in Hungary.

“The United Nations has acted, whether wisely or not, in the Middle East by sending a United Nations force into the Suez Canal area.

“But nothing has been done with reference to observers or a United Nations force in Hungary.

“If the United Nations cannot act, or fails or fears to act, where the Communists are the aggressors, then its future existence is imperilled.

“What we need is deeds,—not words.

“In Israel we witness the determination of Nasser—backed by the Soviet Union—to destroy that brave little country. That is a well known fact. It is also a well known fact that Soviet arms are going into Algeria by way of Egypt, and that the whole unrest in the Middle East and Mediterranean area has its origin in the Kremlin.

“It is an historical fact that for over 200 years, Russia, under the Czars and the Communists, has tried to penetrate the Middle East to gain domination in that important area. In this area in the past two years, the Soviet Union has been able to accomplish what Russia could not accomplish for over 200 years.

“We know of the Soviet sale or giving of arms to Egypt, which brought about a military imbalance in that area harmful to the existence of Israel. Farseeing and courageous leadership on our part would have offset that imbalance by the sale of arms to Israel for defensive purposes. If that had been done, Nasser would probably not have carried out his raids on Israel.

Nasser might then have realized that the eight-year offer of Israel to negotiate peace terms should be accepted. In any event, such action of Nasser in the seizing of the Suez Canal . . ."

CRITICAL RESPONSE TO OUR LEAFLETS

We reserve publication of more excerpts from the extensive and generally friendly correspondence which came to the Friends of Contemporary Issues as a result of their participation in the campaign for support to Hungary to a later date.

The following critical letter from a reader of pacifist inclinations, and the subsequent reply, touch on a matter of special interest, for which reason we give their text here.

December 5, 1956

Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary

Dear Sirs,

This is written not to annoy you but to let you know that my name does not belong on your list, although of course I intend to remain a subscriber to *Contemporary Issues*.

It was with a heavy heart that I saw the name of your committee on the letter you sent me. More human slaughter urged! Heaven forbid. As if there were no other way! As if we were innocent and appointed to punish the guilty! No; war kills indiscriminately. Was the poor Korean peasant who had lost all his family, his home, and his land, was he liberated? He himself thought not.

And what makes anyone think that the governments appealed to are eager to spread freedom and democracy? Consider the tyrannical regimes with which we are allied! If freedom be our aim, we had best begin with our own circle. (Consider, too, our opposition to freeing the Russian peasants from Czarist tyranny.)

Why the trouble in Hungary right now? I think you know our responsibility is involved. Why the trouble over the uranium mines? Were the United States in Russia's position would she let her source of this go? Have we not used violence to obtain valuable natural resources?

Where, asks Sen. Mansfield, was the C.I.A. during all this? In view of the disgraceful part played by the C.I.A. in what was supposedly a native revolution for freedom in East Germany, one may well ask.

We wouldn't accept the olive branch when it was proffered, not even in regard to safe matters such as ending nuclear tests. Can we be surprised at the results?

You say if Russia can commit crimes (aggression), surely we can too. The moral logic of this escapes me. So does the timing. Was not that, perhaps, the logic *Russia* used?

When will mankind ever learn, or will it never, that evil is overcome by good only; that evil does not cancel out evil but compounds it! Socrates said most men do not see this and he doubted if many ever would.

The great powers, of whom we have been mightiest, have sown the wind and are reaping the whirlwind, and the innocent suffer grievously. Don't make them suffer more by killing them. The plight of the refugees should touch the hardest heart. I can remember when twelve million refugees or rather displaced persons were turned out on the road to die or worse, and no

such fuss was made, no such outcry; it makes a difference *whose* victims you are!

I beg you to reconsider your methods of achieving justice and freedom. The enclosed material will help express my concern and a better method—indeed, to my mind, the only one.

Yours very truly,
M. L.

New York, N.Y.
December 21, 1956

Dear Mrs. L.,

Your letter of December 5th expressing concern over the demand to send arms to the Hungarian people was read carefully by the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary and the friends of *Contemporary Issues*. We were impressed with the sincerity of your belief that this proposal would cause more suffering and slaughter if it were adopted by the American government. We were also impressed with your fair-mindedness in intending to remain a subscriber to our magazine knowing that it is a strong supporter, indeed the initiator, of the Emergency Committee. I trust that my review of your arguments against sending the Hungarian people the arms that they have begged for, as well as the elaboration of our reasons for attempting to aid this martyred people with more than empty praise, will be considered in this same spirit.

You are certainly correct to assume that to turn Hungary into another "Korea" in which the land and the people are decimated by two foreign powers would liberate no one. At the time of the Korean war we clearly understood that it was staged not to benefit the Korean peasant but to serve as the rationale for American and European rearmament, which we fought with all our resources. *Contemporary Issues* does not advocate sending the American army to "liberate" Hungary. We advocate sending guns to an unarmed *people* fighting a foreign oppressor for its freedom. This situation, you must agree, is quite different from that which occurred in Korea where two foreign armies trampled a people to dust.

Let us be clear at the outset that the Hungarian *people* rose in revolt against an imposed, Russian-dominated government and a Russian army of occupation. To intimate, as you do in your letter, that the American C.I.A. fomented this struggle or the Berlin riots of 1953, is to betray an amazingly distorted view of these momentous events. (The fact is that the American government fears these mass upheavals and their social consequences as much as the Russian rulers do. This is underscored by the government's not lifting a finger in their support.) After more than a decade of violation, deprivation and suffering at the hands of the Russians and their Hungarian henchmen, tiny Hungary, barehanded, braved a comparatively colossal military force to regain its freedom. Perhaps a pacifist cannot distinguish between a national revolution which shakes the foundations of an enslaving, imperialist empire and an enslaving, imperialist war which spouts democratic slogans to cloak its vile deeds and purposes. The difference exists, nevertheless, and its recognition is essential in guiding the action of those of us who uphold the cause of humanity's liberation and the establishment of a just, humane society.

Contemporary Issues has never advocated violence in the struggle of

mankind for justice and freedom. Indeed, we have often pointed out in our magazine that unless the rulers of our vile social order relinquish their power to the people peaceably, they will reap the whirlwind that you mention in your letter and that has swept Hungary. When the people are driven to revolution we view it as a move of desperation against intolerable circumstances. The brutal social system that oppresses all of humanity, to one degree or another, overwhelmingly weighs upon the people until they are compelled to resist it with their lives. After years of passive resistance the pressure builds up to an elemental explosion comparable in nature to a violent storm. One cannot judge this social explosion as good or evil, in itself, but only by its social consequences. It is precisely these consequences of the social explosion that is today shaking Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe that so frighten the masters of the world because they threaten to topple their unjust social order. Instead of indulging in sterile discussion about violence or non-violence when violated humanity acts in its own behalf, we who speak in their cause must act to shield the people from the arsenal of the masters which is arrayed against them. This shield cannot be made of good wishes or tears, but must be made of sterner stuff.

Let me also venture to say that it is not the unarmed people who launch the terrible violence in a revolution but the oppressors who are desperately trying to save their social system, not a uranium mine or two, as you seem to think. In the early days of the Hungarian revolution, between October 23 and November 4, the Hungarian people, with a minimum of bloodshed (the Hungarian army and thousands of Russian soldiers came over to their side), succeeded through their revolutionary councils, in pressuring the government to end the hated collective farm system, lower the work norms in the factories, establish religious, political and civil freedoms, disband the secret police which had terrorized and violated them and insist on the withdrawal of all Russian troops. Then on that infamous Sunday, November 4, the Russians moved in 5,000 tanks and 200,000 Russian troops to crush the people and reimpose their hated rule. What, Mrs. L., was this people to do? Lie down and die or resist? Unfortunately, the lack of sufficient arms forced many of them to adopt pacifist methods and stop tanks with their bare bodies. The miracle of Hungary is that the people's unbelievable bravery and the disgust of numerous Russian soldiers at butchering a civilian populace have succeeded in keeping the resistance alive through all these agonizing weeks. May I state emphatically, as has recently been confirmed to us by freedom fighters arriving here in New York, that had the Hungarian people possessed a few thousand anti-tank guns and their rockets on November 4 the Russians would not be in Hungary today *violating, slaughtering, murdering, butchering, deporting and enslaving the innocent, long-suffering Hungarian people*. This, at core, is the terrible lesson of the Hungarian revolution which should be inscribed upon the hearts of all well-meaning pacifists.

Not to have guaranteed the success of the Hungarian freedom fight with a few thousand anti-tank guns and their rockets was to condemn the entire Hungarian population to slavery and deportation—this we know from past totalitarian treatment of national rebellions. (Stalin once said that the Hungarian question could be solved with enough cattle-cars.) To sit idly by while 10 million people flounder and drown in a sea of armed Russian might, or cry for the UN savior, who only saves when the American government allows him to, is to forfeit one's claim to humaneness. To divert attention from the resistance while that resistance still breathes, by collecting pennies to cover the

corpses and feed the orphans, is to participate by one's inaction in the creation of more corpses and orphans. Ask yourself why the American government lets 10 million die and parades its concern for some thousands of refugees. The friends of *Contemporary Issues* and the Emergency Committee do not propose to sit in inaction alongside these hypocritical statesmen and their subservient intellectual lackeys. Our appeal is to the American people to pressure the government, which apparently fears a people struggling for its freedom much more than it fears the Russian empire, to send arms while there are still Hungarian freedom fighters to use them.

I am enclosing a speech by Mr. Robert Keller. In it you will find a description of American inaction on Hungary even at the UN where we only talk, I might add, more strongly against our "allies" Britain and France than our "enemy" Russia. I am also sending you, under separate cover, a copy of our magazine containing a social study of Eastern Europe by Mr. Keller. I urge you most sincerely to read and consider our material and ask yourself if pacifism has anything to offer the martyred Hungarian people but its most heartfelt, but most ineffectual, tears. I await your response.

Yours most cordially,
Marian A. Pearl

Mrs. L. has indicated her intention to answer Miss Pearl's remarks in an extended way. It should be noted, however, that many of the friends of CONTEMPORARY ISSUES consider as justified Mrs. L.'s objection to the remark contained in the Emergency Committee's resolutions, "If Russia can send arms to Egypt, the United States can send them to Hungary". We regret the political oversight which led to the introduction of this false note into the text of the resolutions.

*

The following letter has been received from a friend of Contemporary Issues, who participated extensively in the work of the Emergency Committee, in spite of the reservations expressed below.

New York City
Jan. 15, 1956

The Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary

Dear Friends,

The campaign for Arms to Hungary which you have conducted is conditional on your conclusion that such a policy would not provoke the USSR to extend the conflict to the west, and unleash a third world war. I wish to challenge that conclusion.

The very unreliability which you cite as characterising the Russian troops, and the restlessness of the Russian populace, leads us to conclude, not that the Soviet Union is incapable of waging a desperate war, but only that such a war cannot depend on the loyalty of the troops or the obedience of the people. It must then be a war of such a nature that it requires a minimal force of men and depends hardly at all on the productive apparatus which can be immobilized by a rebellious people. It must, in short, be a nuclear war—a war of the very worst sort.

The question is then posed, what purpose such a war would serve. The answer is that it need serve no purpose—not, at least, in the conventional sense that war is an extension of politics in the service of economic interests, and hence must serve some economic purpose. Total war has equipped us with weapons of such lethal nature that a sufficient stockpile releases the warmaker from further dependence on the productive apparatus. On the other hand, totalitarian politics has led to such barbarism that the tyrant faced with the prospect of a successful armed revolution is free also from any hope of survival, through compromise or capitulation. And it is these forms of dependence, upon the productive apparatus, which is controlled by the dominant economic interests, and upon the populace, which is manipulated by these interests, which have in the past precluded the waging of war except with some aim of economic necessity. If the desperate ruler chooses to bring the world down with him, down we will go, one and all. No dictator ever had the opportunity before.

The alternative can only be to wait—and perhaps to have to watch while other peoples rise up and are crushed: not only the satellites, but the minorities of the Soviet Union itself. But with each repression, demoralization will spread and deepen in Russia, and this will be reflected in struggles among the leaders at the top. In these struggles, however, as has been shown since the death of Stalin, to lose power is not necessarily to lose one's life, lose hope of returning to power, or even to lose all of one's power—but perhaps only to have one's power reduced temporarily. We must depend on this process to eventually bring forth leaders who, whatever their function in maintaining the old repressive regime, can be depended upon not to resort to nuclear war. Stalin, in this respect, would be most likely to bring down a holocaust upon the world. Bulganin and Krushchev are somewhat less likely to do so, perhaps, but in view of the nature of the risk, still doubtful. A man like Nagy, however, very susceptible to pressure from below, and not so closely associated with the repressive extremes, might present the opportunity to revolt without the risk of nuclear war.

The foregoing, of course, is not intended to be a hard and fast rating system or blueprint, but a suggestion of what course things are likely to take if left to themselves. It presents a safer course for the world—and though it puts a great burden on the subject peoples of Eastern Europe, and may seem to be a shirking of duty for the rest of the world, the savage repression which the Soviet Union can unleash is preferable even for its victims to their destruction by nuclear war.

With friendly greetings,
Steve Seltzer

It is disappointing to note the rather weak response evoked in American universities by the events in Hungary. The fact that no clamor arose on the campuses to protest the government's ignominious behavior testifies to the backwardness of the American student movement compared to its brilliant Hungarian counterpart which was the heart and soul of the uprising. Largely to blame are the official student organizations, such as the one mentioned in the following letter, who failed to organize student support for the Hungarian people.

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ARMS
TO HUNGARY

P O Box 113 Village Station
150 Christopher Street
New York 14, N. Y.

December 20, 1956

Mr. Steven Boszormenyi
1649 34th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Boszormenyi,

I am informed, by a representative of the Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary who talked with you, that your organization, the Federation of American Students for Freedom, has gotten into considerable "hot water" with the authorities at Georgetown University over leaflets which I distributed at your open meeting, sponsoring Istvan Laszlo, several weeks ago. Apparently I committed several mistakes in handling the distribution: (1) I did not ask for permission beforehand; (2) I handed out the leaflets in too close a proximity to the meeting hall door, so that some confusion might have arisen in the minds of the audience as to who was sponsoring the meeting or, conversely, the leaflets. On both counts I apologize, and hope that you will feel free to use the apology to get your organization back in the good graces of the University.

However, let me say a few words in extenuation. I was not aware that permission to distribute was necessary, and am still at a loss to understand why it is necessary, at a university which professes academic freedom. Nevertheless, if I had known of the regulation and had had adequate time to comply with it—I only learned of the meeting forty-five minutes before it opened—I would have been glad to do so. As to the second count, immediately upon my arrival the first person to whom I handed a leaflet was the usher at the door; he made no objections at all. I gave a leaflet to the policeman in attendance; he requested extra copies for friends. And when one of the officers of your Federation left the meeting hall to explain to me—courteously and not without sympathy—that I was out of order, I immediately granted the justice of his point, and at his suggestion, retired to the campus to continue distribution. Finally I should like to note that the leaflets were clearly marked as to origin, and the enormous disparity between the forthright stand taken in the leaflets and the innocuous words of the speakers inside should have been enough to dispel any initial misunderstanding.

As for the leaflets themselves—their content and tone—that is another matter, and no apology is due. The crying contradiction between American commitments and American actions can never again, after the heroic Hungarian revolution, be ignored. Even the "responsible" American press is forced to take notice. If you read the *Washington Post*, Mr. Boszormenyi, you must be aware that, according to the Alsops, Secretary Dulles has given an un-

equivocal pledge to Khrushchev that we will not interfere with any "settlement" he might wish to devise for Poland. You should also be aware that these same Alsops have written: "When the Hungarian rebellion was at its height, East Germany very nearly went the way of Hungary—far more nearly than is generally recognized here. An East German rebellion was probably only averted because the West German government (with the full knowledge and approval of the American government) used all its power and influence to avert it." And from Chalmers Roberts, in the same newspaper, we learn that the President of the United States "has ordered . . . a complete avoidance of provocation" in the Hungarian affair.

Not only does our government refuse to give effective aid to the people of Hungary; it even renounces strong language, which might encourage them and further isolate the Kremlin. According to the *N. Y. Post*, for example, it was the American delegates, Lodge and Knowland, who were responsible for knocking out the genocide charges from both the Cuban resolution and the resolution sponsored jointly by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru, thereby stripping these protests, not of their teeth, to be sure—they never had any—but of their snarl. And who was it that persuaded Britain and France to drop their resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary on that fateful Friday, November 2nd? According to the *Times* it was—the inevitable Mr. Lodge. One could continue with such examples indefinitely. Only a few days ago the Scripps-Howard staff writer, Wellington Long, observed that it had now been almost six weeks since the U.N. General Assembly instructed Mr. Hammerskjold to appoint an investigating committee to determine and report on the "true" situation in Hungary. It took this estimable gentleman, an obvious Big Power creature, twelve days just to find his 3-man committee, and to date it has done nothing, despite the fact that it "was not necessarily intended to visit Hungary itself, but to determine from diplomatic and other sources in New York what was happening". Apparently the U.S. Government feels that a report from even this harmless squad might have explosive potentialities, for when some members of an unnamed Western nation caucus group tried to bring the question of the committee's lack of accomplishments onto the floor of the Assembly, they "were talked out of it by the United States delegation, for reasons unknown". The Alsops have summed up the whole of American policy with uncommon honesty: "Our total activity about the Hungarian problem has been to support [?] high-sounding but empty resolutions in the United Nations, which are voted for with universal, cynical hypocrisy, in the clear knowledge that they will produce no result whatsoever". To be sure, these are "dirty words", not nice at all, one might say; but what is a man to do when gripped, even if only once in a while, with a passion for truthful expression?

Attempts have been made—they are common enough in the press and admittedly all State Department inspired—to excuse this shameful prudence by invoking the spectre of war. This is a typical Pennsylvania Avenue crudity, of the kind we have come to expect over the last decade or so, and it does not bother these gentlemen one whit that it contradicts everything they themselves have said and written for lo, these many years. It was not long ago the fashion to dismiss every shabby deal with Stalin by reference to the unbroken totalitarian facade of Soviet Europe and Asia. Now that demonstrable cracks have appeared, which threaten to gut the whole structure, it is pointed out (with the aid of vulgar, inapplicable analogies of wounded lions, tigers, panthers, wolves and bears at bay) that the situation is fraught with even

graver peril. It takes an ad-man imagination indeed to depict a determined band of Kremlin warriors sallying forth to do battle with the whole world, at a time when they shrink from their own people, quarrel among themselves as to the proper course, and end by offering concession after concession in the hope of staving off a terrible end. So far they have made a graceful retreat; at any moment it may turn into a disgraceful rout. The irresolution in the Kremlin is echoed in the satellites. The people stir, grumble, grow bolder, hurl themselves against their rulers with unparalleled courage. Their fervor knows no boundaries, no iron curtains. The blood of Hungarian martyrs seeps through and infects the Soviet Union itself. That thousands of soldiers, many from the elite of the Soviet army, such as the Second Guards Division, have deserted to the Hungarian Revolution is now a matter of common notoriety. In Carpatho-Ruthenia trains are derailed by Ukrainian partisans, forcing the Soviets to provision their troops in Hungary through Rumania. The whole *Baltikum* stirs, fired by underground leaflets. So serious is the situation in Lithuania that the press feels compelled to warn those "reactionaries" who, inspired by the Hungarian example, have "begun to raise their heads". At Moscow University students are arrested for forming "an underground political organization", and a whole class walks out on a lecturer parroting the official line on Hungary. When Shepilov recently appeared before a meeting there, he was hissed; when Khrushchev himself tried to address a youth group, he was silenced, not by boos, but prolonged applause. In Leningrad the situation is no different; the "unhealthy state of mind" of the students there was just the other day deplored by *Pravda*. These challenging incidents cannot be dismissed, Mr. Boszormenyi, as a Russian substitute for the American panty-raid. It is a deadly serious business. Nor can we dismiss cavalierly (perhaps as October celebrations?) the reports of unrest and strikes in areas as widely removed from each other as the Ukraine, the Urals and Moscow Oblast! In the first period of the Hungarian revolt a strike broke out—unheard of!—at the Ball-bearing Plant Imeni Kaganovicha, and when Mme. Furtseva was sent from the Presidium itself to remonstrate, she was hooted from the platform, "pale and shaken", and surrounded by police. Today's news is even more striking. When, a few hours ago, I read of a week-long strike at the immense Putilov works in Leningrad, I decided that I could no longer delay this letter to you. Thirty-nine years ago, Mr. Boszormenyi, it was workers from this same complex who were always the first to hit the streets, with wrenches or commandeered rifles, during the July Days, the Kornilov revolt, the October Revolution, in support of Bolshevism. Now the situation is reversed. What does this mean? What do all of these things, taken together, mean? The Alsops have admitted that this is the same pattern of events that preceded the Poznan riots and the Hungarian uprising—and it does not matter that they qualify this admission with "expert" testimony that there is little likelihood of another Hungary within the Soviet Union itself. The Alsops and the "experts" said the same thing before East Berlin, before Poznan, before Budapest. They will probably continue to say the same thing when Khrushchev & Company, chased from Moscow, set up their "Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government" in Yakutsk or Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka.

Once upon a time—was it really only two months ago?—these harassed, frightened men in the Kremlin were referred to, with awe, as realists; now, overnight, they turn into political schoolboys. Is it possible to consider this besieged leadership a threat when its satellites can only be held down with American connivance, when it cannot control its own people, its own army,

its own bureaucracy, when the stresses and strains which rend the whole of Soviet society bruise their way into the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee itself? Ordinary wounded bears are, of course, dangerous; but what are we to think of a bear which can no longer direct its faculties, the Russian people; a bear which watches with horror while its claws are used, not to lash out at interlopers, but to lacerate its own bowels? War, Mr. Boszormenyi? War under these circumstances? No government ever has, and no government ever will. The first step taken to implement such a policy would mean, not the beginning of the end, but the end itself.

Let me be equally frank with regard to another matter. Our representative, who approached you with the object of initiating discussions between the Committee and your Federation, reports that one of your objections to us (he has the feeling that it was tendered with some embarrassment) was our way of going about the matter; we were interested in action, while you were interested in the "intellectual side" of the problem. My friend was shocked and at a loss, understandably so. Now I do not want to preach or belabor the obvious, but it nevertheless remains true that intellectuals have a tremendous obligation to the society that raised them up; they are indebted to that society, not only for their opportunities, but for their very ideas, drawn from a collective experience. This debt is in no way cancelled by the accumulation of intellectual capital in a closed corporation. I am aware, of course, that some of you are probably foreign service students at Georgetown, and hence may be reluctant to jeopardize your chances of employment by taking a prominent part in any effective protest against the shabby role played by the United States Government. This is a serious problem; it cannot be minimized, and I am thoroughly sympathetic, since it is not for a moment to be doubted that the State Department is capable of instituting reprisals without a second thought. Here we cannot begin to give advice; it is a personal matter between you and your conscience, and I know neither its magnitude nor the intensity of its demands. But I do know this: personal conduct which up until a few months ago would have satisfied most men who take their responsibilities seriously can no longer pass muster. The world can no longer be the same after Hungary. The standards set by those heroic people are so high that we all, every last one of us, suffer by comparison. What you and your organization think of us is of no moment. If we use dirty words, ignore us. If our "intemperance" would prove to be an embarrassment and a liability, breathe not our name. But please do not think that by devoting several hours each week to a detached discussion of the tragedy of Eastern Europe that you have exhausted your responsibilities. Certainly the Hungarian people deserve better treatment than that. Thrash out among yourselves the problem of "what is to be done"; embody your conclusions in resolutions; take them to the campus; take them to Capital Hill; take them to Pennsylvania Avenue. And if they refuse to accept your appeal, insist—are they not our representatives?—on the reason why. That is responsible political action. We owe it to the Hungarian people. We owe it to the Russian people. We owe it, yes, to the American people, who every year are beaten with the Russian stick to the tune of thirty, forty or fifty billion dollars, not to mention a goodly portion of our shrinking civil liberty.

If I have spoken sharply, I have also spoken sincerely, and I hope it is received in the same spirit. May I hear from you?

Respectfully,
Chambers McAdory

The following letter was written in reply to a liberal objector to the campaign who asked that her own letter be withheld from publication until she is able to present a more thorough elaboration of her position. It is reprinted because the objections with which it deals are among those most frequently encountered by the supporters of military aid to the Hungarian revolt.

Jan. 8, 1957

Dear —,

It is apparent from your letters that you are bewildered at what impels us, whom you know as opponents of both nuclear war and imperialist politics, to call for the dispatch of weapons by the United States to the Hungarian freedom fighters. You sense an abandonment of principle, a retreat from position, a surrender to "emotion" (I quote your initial letter). I hope to show you that we have done none of these things; to do so, however, let me sketch first in broad outline our appreciation of the Hungarian events, which differs rather profoundly from your own.

Viewed from a distance—on the topography of history, so to speak—the Hungarian Revolution is certainly one of the most remarkable and soul-stirring events in the annals of man's fight for freedom. One seeks in vain for an historical analogy to this uprising by virtually an entire population acting as one man in a determination to cast off the yoke of slavery in the face of the most enormous odds. The French and Russian revolutions, the Paris Commune—their context and significance, for the moment, aside—are pale shadows next to the Budapest insurrection of 1956. Is it possible to see an entire youth in its teens fighting—nay leading—a revolt against modern armor, a working class united for weeks in a general strike (in length itself unprecedented) and the population everywhere extending active assistance, without realizing: Here is something extraordinary in the highest degree! This "pure" revolution, without plan, without leadership, forged out of nothing but the unalloyed courage and improvisatory genius of the people, is indeed, "a special event of unusual significance and therefore of special importance". On emotional grounds alone (and there is nothing to be ashamed of in emotion) it is next to impossible to stand by dispassionately, watch a people pour forth its blood for the right to live as human beings and lift not a finger in their behalf. You may say that people have died before and in greater numbers in Korea, in Indochina and on the thousand and one battlefields which imperialism has left as its monuments, but that is surely missing the point. There have been worse horrors and more terrible slaughters than in Hungary, but nothing to match the poignancy of an entire population throwing itself *of its own will* against tanks and artillery, looking desperately for a modicum of assistance—and being left to expire. Thus, our efforts to assist the Hungarians represent in reality merely the fulfilment of an elementary human duty, the manifestation of the most basic human solidarity. It would have been difficult for us to live with our consciences had we done otherwise.

I have deliberately chosen to engage you at what you consider our weakest point—the heart. But that is only the merest beginning of the explanation for our stand. If reason without emotion is sterile, emotion without reason is blind. It is our hope to be neither the one nor the other.

Thus it is in the historical as well as the human sense that we regard what has happened in Hungary as "a special event of unusual significance and therefore of special importance" and are unable to relegate it to merely "part of a great global crisis" along with Indochina, Korea, North Africa and Guatemala. That these events are "part of a great global crisis" we surely

recognize, but analysis must go further than that. Within the crisis there are moments of greater and lesser importance, of greater and lesser significance from the viewpoint of a solution to that crisis. From this standpoint, I do not hesitate to say that the Hungarian Revolution represents the most important event in a decade.

If Hungary alone were concerned, this obviously could not be the case. But the future of not only Hungary and Eastern Europe but of Germany, Europe and Russia itself has been called into question by the events radiating out from Budapest, because they have brought this monstrous Byzantine empire a huge step closer to its collapse. And this collapse is indeed "the prerequisite if we have any hope for a humane social order in the world". To counter, as you do, that this is the position held by "U.S. military leaders, such columnists as David Lawrence, such Senators as Eastland, McCarthy, *et al*" is to slip unwittingly into a type of argument the Stalinists themselves have made notorious, and is about as accurate as the accusation that it was the position of Adolph Hitler. To attribute to the gentlemen in question any interest in "a humane social order" is a certificate I, for one, am not willing to award them without better credentials, and the genuineness of their protestations about overthrowing the Kremlin may be judged in the light of their deeds during the acid test of Hungary. It takes little perspicacity to realize that McCarthy, Eastland, *et al* have made a business out of attacking Russian totalitarianism the better to impose its most significant features here in the United States, and that they will be truly interested in "the overthrow of the Kremlin" on the day they have something better, made in America, to put in its place. Not a single one of these staunch Kremlin fighters, significantly enough, saw fit to demand of the government what we did, and we took the trouble to make sure that Sen. McCarthy, at least, did not have the excuse of having overlooked the matter.

If you consider the Ball statement too extreme, consider for a moment how the Russian slave state stands astride two continents, thwarts every democratic movement, perverts the economic development of half of Europe, prevents the unification of Germany and therefore that of Europe on a rational basis, and furnishes the pretext for the diversion of humanity's wealth into the bottomless pit of armament production. To hope with "Nehru and Toynbee" (Isaac Deutscher is the real grandfather of the idea) that "industrialization" will somehow bring an automatic amelioration of affairs is to have faith in a caricature of economic determinism which serves today principally as the vehicle for an apologetic for Stalinism. That you should invoke in your support Nehru, who waited three weeks before uttering even the mildest reproof for the Hungarian bloodbath, I find surprising. As for the contention itself, you must know that industrialization did not ameliorate but rather intensified the despotic features of Japanese society, that the highest degree of industrialization outside of America did not prevent totalitarianism from tightening its grip on Germany. What makes the idea so pernicious, however, is the germ of truth it contains. Stalin's industrialization, to be sure, has stirred up forces, even within the bureaucracy, which strive for release from the restrictions of Stalin's police state. But without the pressure of popular upheavals, both potential and actual, these forces will never have the opportunity to assert themselves even to the point of creating that hybrid dictatorial form now parading as Gomulkaism. To hope to "reform" a capitalist democracy into a different breed of animal without violence is a brave experiment which can lose nothing so long as an eye is kept firmly on the

goal; to "reform" a totalitarian dictatorship is a wish that cannot even be expressed except at the risk of having one's head separated from his body.

That society is dynamic, that industrialization changes conditions, that social institutions change to adjust to conditions—all these are truisms, but they are somewhat stale, flat and unprofitable ones. Recognition of society's dynamism, of its changing character, in itself yields no information about the direction of the change much less any assurance that the change will be a welcome one. Humanity can ill afford to wait with patience and suffering for an autonomous "industrialization" to bring those benefits which can in reality only be obtained by human effort. For while economic advance contains the germ of a better society, that seed must be nourished lest it go stillborn. Industrialization will no more produce democracy of itself in Russia than it will a rational economy in America.

Your counterposing of "pressure on the U.S. Government to provide . . . an unequivocal demonstration that non-militaristic democracy can solve human problems" implies that the Kremlin leaders, if only they were shown the "advantages" of democracy, would be quick to contract their empire and bestow its benefits on the starving Soviet population. This is an optimism which it is difficult to share, since democracy's advantages for the people are counter-balanced by its disadvantages for the rulers—the foremost of these being that they may not remain rulers very long. And while it is true that "non-militaristic democracy" in the United States—involving an abandonment of nuclear weapons and the rational use of productive forces for human welfare—would bring Khrushchev & Co. to the brink of the abyss, it is hardly likely that they would accept history's verdict gracefully and retire into the wings without a violent push. In any case, this is all somewhat academic at a moment when Russian tanks and troops are conducting slaughter on a scale that should be sufficient to convince even the most skeptical that there is only one language the bureaucracy understands.

This is, after all, the heart of the matter. Reflect, for a moment, that it was not the Hungarian people but the Russians who chose the weapons with which the Hungarian Revolution was fought. This is a fact upon which all but completely ossified pacifist thought would find it worthwhile to reflect. The Hungarians, who on the night of Oct. 22 had not the faintest idea of making any sort of revolution at all, much less a violent one, found themselves armed to the teeth and fighting for their lives against overwhelming military might in less than 72 hours. The Budapest students and workers began with peaceful, if militant, demonstrations and the orderly presentation of elementary democratic requests to the government. It required not one but two instances of unprovoked mass murder on the part of the secret police and Russian troops before the populace, several of whom had previously refused an offer of guns from Hungarian soldiers, took up arms in self-defense. Indeed, what else was there for them to do other than remain to be shot or slink off to their homes and behave again like "good socialist citizens". The unavoidable fact is that the techniques of so-called "passive resistance" (which are not without their appropriateness if not fetishized into a master key) inevitably pass over into violence once they become sufficiently widespread to threaten the existence of an oppressive regime and thus provoke military counter-steps. Self-defense, under these circumstances, is a simple reflex against which it is as useful to inveigh as against the setting of the sun. And this defensive violence, once begun, can stop short of complete victory only at peril to the very existence of the movement and the people who compose it. This is the logic of revolution,

and its harshness is not of the Hungarian people's choosing, much less ours.

You express doubt that this violent revolution can "accomplish any of the aims desired by humanity or democrats", by which I take it that you consider defeat inevitable. But the sweeping successes won by the revolution in its early days, the wavering and desertion among Russian troops, the indecision manifested by the Kremlin—all these should suffice to demonstrate how close to victory this revolution did approach. And mark you, the final word has not yet been written, either in Hungary itself or the remainder of the Russian domain. The Russians cannot continue to rule Hungary in the manner that they now have been forced to; it yields them no profit and prepares an even greater disaster. We are witnessing, in Hungary and Poland, only the beginning of a retreat which the Kremlin will find it difficult if not impossible to halt.

All this, mind you, has been without the receipt of an iota of help from the great arms warehouses of the west. A relatively small number of these weapons, dropped from American planes, would have been sufficient, I am firmly convinced, to turn the tide of battle decisively. There is a limit to the length and extent to which the Russians could have waged war in Hungary without risking complete collapse. Arming of the Hungarian population with bazookas and other weapons of deadly effectiveness against Russian armor and artillery would have written an entirely different ending to the Budapest uprising. That this would be "impractical" I have yet to see demonstrated; whether it would have been "disinterested" is a matter that I find of little concern. In the first place, inside or outside the context of the "Cold War", the "interests" of the United States government once it began dropping arms into Hungary would make little difference. These arms would be in the hands of the Hungarians, who would use them to determine their own fate, not of American soldiers who would use them to impose a government of Washington's choosing. We have not, you will notice, called for American troops in Hungary, an omission which, you can be sure, is based upon more than a fear of World War III. In the second place, it is precisely to the interests of the United States government NOT to supply the Hungarians with arms. Only a great popular outcry here at home could move it to do so, and in such a setting the United States' whole policy abroad would be compelled to undergo vast changes.

You are certainly correct when you maintain that the Soviet government has manifested a dread of global war, but you will be hard put to adduce a cause for this dread other than Russia's glaring weakness. This weakness is primarily organic-economic and only latently functional-political. The fear of nuclear annihilation is certainly a factor, but this concern, while it governs American policy, as well, has not produced the same noticeable dread of world conflict in that quarter. The difference lies in that military-economic superiority which would guarantee American victory, no matter at what cost, in any showdown war. This endemic Russian weakness has now been most profoundly deepened by internal developments of the last year, not only in Eastern Europe but in Russia itself. The contention that this very weakness could intensify the danger of war has become a familiar one, but it is not an easy opinion to sustain. The analogy with Japan is, for one thing, an invalid one, for Japan was confronted with an economic squeeze, not internal dissension, when it finally embarked upon war with the United States as a last alternative. For Japan, war was not a diversion, it was the only solution short of economic collapse. Russia's economic crisis is of an entirely different

nature, unrelated to foreign markets; far from impelling the nation toward a perilous military adventure it cries out for relief from the burden of militarism. This need is reflected among large layers of even the ruling strata and contributes to the growing internal differentiation. The Russian government is wracked by a crisis of leadership; there is no faction which has the power to plunge the nation into the abyss to save its own skin. We are witnessing an empire in internal collapse, and these are not the empires that launch wars.

As for Hungary itself, you express doubt that a "democratic socialist government" would emerge from the revolution. Well, for my part, I would welcome any sort of democratic government as an alternative to the Stalinist despotism, and believe me, such a government would emerge, if not "automatically", *organically* from a successful revolution. You cannot, I am sure, take seriously the Stalinist libel that the Hungarian workers, peasants and students have taken their lives in their hands for love of Admiral Horthy and a compelling desire to return their land to its former owners. The fact is that eminently appropriate demands of a "democratic socialist" nature were advanced by the revolutionists, who sought division of the land among the peasants and operation of the factories by the workers. How close this would have come to "socialism" is another question, tied up with Hungary's economic level and the extent to which its revolution were to find an echo in the rest of Europe, most importantly Germany. But that, as they say in the storybooks, is a tale for another day. For the Hungarians, faced with an opportunity to breathe freedom after a decade of totalitarianism, there is nothing more appropriate than a paraphrase of the Biblical aphorism: "Sufficient unto the day is the goodness thereof".

PAUL ECKER

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Elseviers Weekblad
W. G. N. de Keizer, Editor
Amsterdam,
Spuistraat 100—112

January 8, 1957

Emergency Committee for Arms to Hungary

Dear Sirs,

We are very sorry to have kept you waiting for a reply to your letter of the 6th of December, but we have been busy with the matter of Hungary, as it was our task to inform the Dutch people of the terrible events taking place in that country.

However, as it seems quite impracticable to send arms to Hungary, it would be better not to write about it either. Especially as in this particular case the official policy—and this goes certainly also for the American government—seems to be simple: leave the Hungarians to die alone.

Yours faithfully,
ELSEVIERS WEEKBLAD
W. G. N. de Keizer, Editor

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